

CLIMATE CHANGE

31/2022

# Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change

Final report

CLIMATE CHANGE 31/2022

Ressortforschungsplan of the Federal Ministry for the Environment,  
Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection

Project No. (FKZ) 3715 41 105 0

Report No. (UBA-FB) FB000662/ENG

# **Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change**

Final report

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On behalf of the German Environment Agency

## Imprint

### **Publisher**

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[info@umweltbundesamt.de](mailto:info@umweltbundesamt.de)  
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### **Report completed in:**

July 2019

### **Edited by:**

Section I 1.2 Internationale Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien, Politik- und Wissenstransfer  
Dr. Carmen Gottwald

Publication as pdf:

<https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/publikationen>

ISSN 1862-4804

Dessau-Roßlau, June 2022

The responsibility for the content of this publication lies with the author(s).

**Abstract: Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change**

This report offers guidance for climate change adaptation programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It consists of a guide on conflict-sensitive adaptation as well as three analytical chapters which describe the analytical, conceptual and empirical basis. The guide outlines how to design and implement an adaptation project in a fragile or conflict-affected context. It provides guidance to ensure that an adaptation activity does not exacerbate tensions and, ideally, contributes to peace and stability. Starting point for the development of the guide is the observation that any adaptation project has an impact, either positive or negative, on political dynamics. This is especially relevant for countries which are fragile or conflict-affected. If poorly designed or executed a project might unintentionally lead to tensions, even an outbreak of violence. It is therefore imperative that adaptation projects are developed and implemented in a way that they are sensitive to conflictual situations on the ground. Ideally, they should be designed and implemented in a way that they contribute to stabilise the situation and prevent conflicts. The report offers a stocktaking of conflict sensitivity and adaptation in theory and practice. It helps identifying key design elements of a guide on conflict-sensitive adaptation through a review of existing guides on conflict sensitivity in general and how adaptation to climate change is or can be reflected by these approaches based on empirical insights and a consultations process with experts from the different issues areas affected.

**Kurzbeschreibung: Leitfaden für konfliktssensitive Anpassung an den Klimawandel**

Der vorliegende Bericht bietet Leitlinien für Anpassungsmaßnahmen an den Klimawandel in fragilen und konfliktgeprägten Kontexten. Es wird beschrieben, wie Anpassungsaktivitäten an den Klimawandel in einem fragilen oder von Konflikten betroffenen Kontext entworfen und implementiert werden können. Er gibt Leitlinien vor, um sicherzustellen, dass ein Anpassungsprojekt Spannungen nicht verschärft und im Idealfall zu Frieden und Stabilität beiträgt. Ausgangspunkt für die Entwicklung der Leitlinien ist die Beobachtung, dass jedes Anpassungsprojekt die politische Dynamik beeinflusst – entweder auf eine positive oder auf eine negative Weise. Das ist insbesondere für fragile und von Konflikt betroffene Länder relevant. Ein schlecht entworfenes oder ausgeführtes Projekt kann unter Umständen zu unbeabsichtigten Spannungen und Gewaltausbrüchen führen. Es ist daher unerlässlich, dass Anpassungsprojekte so entwickelt und umgesetzt werden, dass sie Konfliktsituationen vor Ort berücksichtigen. Idealerweise sollten sie so konzipiert und implementiert werden, dass sie zur Stabilisierung der Situation und zur Verhinderung von Konflikten beitragen. Der Bericht bietet eine Bestandsaufnahme zu Konfliktsensitivität und Anpassung in Theorie und Praxis. Er trägt anhand von vorhandenen Leitfäden zu Konfliktsensitivität im Allgemeinen dazu bei, wichtige Elemente eines Leitfadens für konfliktssensitive Anpassung zu ermitteln, und herauszufinden, inwiefern sich die Anpassung an den Klimawandel in diesen Ansätzen bereits widerspiegelt oder widerspiegeln könnte. Zu dieser Bestandsaufnahme tragen auch empirische Analysen und die Erkenntnisse aus einem umfassenden Konsultationsprozess bei, in welchem Vertreterinnen und Vertreter aus den betroffenen Politikfeldern eingebunden waren.

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## List of abbreviations

<b>ACCIH</b>	Adaptación al cambio climático y reducción del riesgo de desastres en cuencas prioritizadas de Ica y Huancavelica
<b>BMZ</b>	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>CAF</b>	Conflict Assessment Framework
<b>CAST</b>	Conflict Assessment System Tool
<b>CbA</b>	Community-based Approaches
<b>CENEPRED</b>	Centro Nacional de Estimación, Prevención y Reducción del Riesgo de Desastres
<b>CERCAPAZ</b>	Peacebuilding by promoting cooperation between government and civil society
<b>COP</b>	Conference of the Parties
<b>COSERAM</b>	Conflict Sensitive Resource and Asset Management
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>DEC</b>	Department of Environment and Conservation
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>EbA</b>	Ecosystem-based Adaptation
<b>EIA</b>	Environmental Impact Assessment
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GIZ</b>	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
<b>IDDRSI</b>	IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced People
<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<b>IKI</b>	International Climate Initiative
<b>INDCs</b>	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>KfW</b>	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
<b>LDCs</b>	Least Developed Countries
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation

<b>NAP</b>	National Adaptation Plan
<b>NDCs</b>	Nationally Determined Contributions (in Paris-Agreement)
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-governmental organisations
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>ONDS</b>	Oficina Nacional de Diálogo y Sostenibilidad
<b>PCA</b>	Peace and Conflict Assessment
<b>PM</b>	Project Manager
<b>PNG</b>	Papua New Guinea
<b>PRCPT</b>	Programme to strengthen resilience and peaceful coexistence in Chad
<b>RCEI</b>	Regional Capacity Enhancement Initiative
<b>SC</b>	Security Council
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SURGE</b>	Supporting UNHCR Resources on the Ground with Experts on mission
<b>UBA</b>	Umweltbundesamt
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNCCD</b>	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>YUS</b>	Yopno-Uruwa-Som



## Summary

To limit the global mean temperature close to 1.5° degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions is the key response. However, since climate change impacts are already visible in many parts of the world, adapting to the adverse consequences of climate change is crucial – especially for the most vulnerable countries. Adaptation refers to “adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts. It refers to changes in processes, practices, and structures to moderate potential damages or to benefit from opportunities associated with climate change” (UNFCCC 2018).

Among the countries most vulnerable to climate change are many fragile and conflict-affected countries. Given limited resources and capacities, protracted crises and violence it can be challenging for fragile and conflict-affected states to fully engage and implement adaptation activities and, thus, to effectively manage vulnerabilities. In addition to already existing challenges for fragile countries the increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events caused by climate change such as storms, droughts and floods can put additional pressure on the coping capacities. In addition, this includes also long-term environmental changes such as sea level rise and desertification as processes to destroy people’s livelihoods. As a result, deaths, injuries, widespread destruction, economic disruption and sudden displacement can become more likely if adaptation to climate change is not a political priority and sufficiently supported. In addition to sudden onset events also slow onset events such as sea level rise and desertification are adding additional burden to these countries.

Efforts to adapt to climate change increasingly require scientific expertise, political know-how, appropriate resources and public support. Many countries face significant challenges and barriers to assessing their adaptation needs and developing strategies and tools for adaptation. The international community is seeking to support those countries. To do so, various tools and guidance documents were developed at the sectoral level to facilitate adaption planning and implementation. However, the specific challenges for adaptation programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts have hardly been addressed. Considerations of peace and conflict have been largely absent from international adaptation governance. As a result, adaptation efforts in respective countries is often still in its early stage.

This report aims at addressing this gap by offering guidance for adaptation programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It consists of a guide on conflict-sensitive adaptation as well as three analytical chapters which describe the analytical, conceptual and empirical basis. The guide outlines how to design and implement an adaptation project in a fragile or conflict-affected context. It provides guidance to ensure that an adaptation project does not exacerbate tensions and, ideally, contributes to peace and stability. Starting point for the development of the guide is the observation that any adaptation project has an impact, either positive or negative, on political dynamics. This is especially relevant for countries which are fragile or conflict-affected. If poorly designed or executed a project might unintentionally lead to tensions, even an outbreak of violence. It is therefore imperative that adaptation projects are developed and implemented in a way that they are sensitive to conflictual situations on the ground. Ideally, they should be designed and implemented in a way that they contribute to stabilise the situation and prevent conflicts.

This report starts with a scoping section in chapter two to provide the background to the debate on adaptation to climate change as a challenge in fragile and conflict prone areas. This section describes the overall environment in which any guidance and tools can be used. To this end a stocktaking of conflict sensitivity and adaptation in theory and practice was prepared. This section aims at identifying key design elements of a guide on conflict-sensitive adaptation

through a review of existing guides on conflict sensitivity in general and how adaptation to climate change is or can be reflected by these approaches. By analysing strengths and weaknesses, good practices could be identified related to the implementation of conflict sensitive approaches. Another key outcome of this research is that there exists no common, widely accepted methodology how to assess and address the links between climate change, conflict and fragility. The scoping focuses on the following tools: “Climate Change and Conflict” by USAID (2015), “How to guide to conflict sensitivity” by CSC (2012) and the “Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected states and situations” by OECD DAC (2007). The analysis reveals that conflict-sensitive approaches as such are not new, however concrete approaches to the area of climate change adaptation are still at the very beginning.

In a second step of this scoping, the selected case studies on conflict sensitivity in practice are examined and analysed in which way conflicts are reflected in the program or project design. The authors explore a project on integrating disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention in Chad, an indigenous forest reserve support project in Papua New Guinea, an approach on conflict-sensitive resource and asset management in the Philippines, innovative development planning for climate change adaptation in Mali, resource management as entry point for conflict transformation in Colombia and a project on complementarity of climate change adaptation and conflict transformation in Peru. Overall objective of the scoping of selected project approaches which have been considered as good practice among practitioners is also to distil key elements of a successfully implemented conflict-sensitive project. Against the backdrop of the insights gained through this conceptual and practical review, key criteria for the design of a guide on conflict-sensitive adaptation are then outlined. This includes goals, instruments, and means of implementation.

In chapter three, selected challenges, limitations and opportunities for integrating conflict sensitivity in climate change adaptation activities in fragile contexts are explored. First, the focus is directed to examine strategies for engagement in fragile contexts by international actors (3.1). Different ways to addressing fragility and adopting a conflict-sensitive approach are analysed. Among the major insights of the existing literature in this field are to reduce the complexity of the project approach and prioritise the improvement of skill development. This also includes defining clear goals of a project, being realistic regarding the speed of goal achievement and the readiness of the international partner to invest in the training of its staff to ensure a conflict-sensitive approach. The scoping of challenges also provides insights on the prospects of cooperating with alternative governance actors and of integrating them into project design and implementation.

Second, explore the role of guiding ideas that can serve as major stepping stones for successfully implementing conflict-sensitive adaptation (3.2). This analysis is mainly based on “lessons learned” coming from the peace and development sector as well as from case studies on programs in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The results illustrate what is needed to successfully implement conflict-sensitive adaptation measures. First, the local context with all its challenges and limitations plays an important role and needs to be taken seriously. Second, closely related to the first element, promoting local ownership is important to empower local actors to participate in the design of programmes. Third, it turns out to be helpful to maximise impartiality and to allow for regular feedback during programme design and implementation. Finally, the role partners are taking needs to be well reflected. For example, it is more promising to adopt a supportive and facilitative, not an instructing role. To this end, also a flexible, open-ended program design can help. As far as possible the establishment of open and transparent communication channels is also a useful element to support this process.

A last important aspect for the role adaptation can play in general in fragile and conflict prone areas is the extent to which respective countries themselves consider adaptation to climate

change or, more broadly, any action to avoid negative consequences for peace and stability as a result of climate change. To find answers in this regard, the relevance of climate change and climate change adaptation for the international forum that is the most important one in terms of dealing with questions of peace and security - the United Nations Security Council is analysed (chapter 3.3). The Council is increasingly recognised as an important forum to address climate change and security as a topic complementing the activities of other main fora to discuss climate change in general such as the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change. It is analysed why the Council considers climate change to be a threat to peace and security and identify major frames and storylines used during the respective discussions. Compared to other SC debates, a large number of states participated in the debates in 2007 and 2011. However, fragile states have not played a major part in framing the issue. As a result, the Council as institution may miss the chance to move over from an agenda setting stage (“climate change is a threat to peace and security”) to one where early actions on climate change related security risks are pushed forward. The non-permanent membership in the Security Council of Germany in 2019 and 2020 offers a useful window to partner with fragile countries and to bring in their perspective more prominently. In order to encourage more active involvement of fragile states representatives during climate security related debates in the Security Council, foreign policy makers may also invite for bilateral briefing sessions to further explore how to use climate change adaptation as a threat minimiser.

In the context of a broader expert consultation process to incorporate insights and external views of different stakeholders, three workshops were organized to present and discuss preliminary findings of this report. The individual outcomes of these consultations, which were spread across the entire project duration, are detailed in chapter four.

The first workshop was the occasion to focus on different criteria for conflict-sensitive climate change adaptation and precisely on questions revolving around goals, instruments and implementation opportunities of conflict-sensitive approaches to climate change adaptation. It became clear that a regular knowledge exchange and sharing of experiences coupled with a translation of the approaches into the appropriate climate and environmental policy language are among the pre-conditions to conflict-sensitive adaptation. Conflict-sensitive approaches can add value to adaptation projects if the different target dimensions are clearly stated, if applied methods and instruments are well-balanced and if the overarching process is designed in a context-specific, participative, long-term and flexible manner. Depending on the context, multiple factors such as the cultural background of staff, possible resistance against chosen methods and explanations, safety standards in high-risk countries and the time-consuming establishment of exchange and learning platforms need to be taken into account. Involving political partners and paying particular attention to local, cultural legitimacy concepts is key to the participatory set-up of stakeholder consultations in the design of any successful conflict-sensitive adaptation approach.

The second consultation process held during COP23 in Bonn provided insights on adaptation and climate change security risks and particularly benefitted from contributions made by practitioners from the development and climate change area during the workshop. It was noted that conflict-sensitive projects are by definition very complex and will not always be entirely feasible for the area of climate change. In order to improve the application of conflict-sensitive adaptation strategies, the establishment and promotion of a “community of practice”-network consisting of experienced experts could be beneficial. Remaining aware of the necessary resources (financial, technical and human) and channels to secure them, especially with regards to fragile states that are particularly affected by the consequences of climate change but have clear limitations on access to (financial) resources constitutes a major challenge for

practitioners and decision-makers. A third workshop was therefore convened to address these and other practical issues related to conflict-sensitive adaptation on the ground.

At the final workshop, taking place during the 2017 Planetary Security Conference, representatives from the European Commission, the peace and development community, governments and academia discussed practical experiences from the field that also informed the guidelines developed as part of this report. Experts agreed on the fact that security implications resulting from natural disasters and climate change have only been translated into strategy documents and organisational practice to a limited extent. To close this gap, both in theory and in practice, the allocation of funds for projects in fragile contexts should always be conflict-sensitive. To this end, it is vital to communicate the benefits of conflict-sensitive action more effectively, for instance through good practice examples. Finally, developing sector-specific policies and consistently integrating local actors in the planning and implementation processes can contribute to approaches that are specifically geared to needs and capacities in the field. As part of an overall stronger ambition to integrate affected communities, consideration should also be given to whether and how the knowledge and financial potential of diaspora organisations and so-called 'migrant self-organisations'- organisations founded by migrants themselves and which make up the majority of their members- could be used to support fragile states or to develop complementary funding sources for (conflict-sensitive) adaptation projects.

In chapter five main elements of the resulting guide on conflict sensitive adaptation are presented - based on the insights gathered during the activities outlined in chapter two to four. The guide was already published in summer 2019 as a separate publication and is summarised here with its main elements. The guide addresses planners and project managers involved in designing and implementing an adaptation project in fragile or conflict-affected contexts. This includes donors, practitioners from central and local governments, non-governmental organisations and other implementing agencies. It seeks to sensitise these users how their interventions could be or have been interacting with conflict in unintentional ways and to stimulate thinking how to prevent negative impacts on conflict dynamics. The secondary audience are planners and project managers in the broader development and peacebuilding community.

The guide is of general nature. It is neither prescriptive nor does it provide an in-depth treatment of policy-specific issues and challenges. It does not offer a template that will be applicable to all situations. This is due to the fact that each country, region and project has a unique context and will develop in a unique manner. The strategic questions and processes to be followed will therefore differ in each case. Accordingly, the guide must be tailored to different needs and audiences. The tools and methods listed stem primarily from established guidelines and frameworks in the fields of humanitarian assistance, peace-building and development. Practitioners and researcher in these fields pioneered conflict-sensitivity. As such, this guideline seeks to make use of the knowledge that is already there and has benefitted from available insights.

The guide comprises of different modules for a practical step-by-step guidance on how to integrate conflict sensitivity into the development and implementation of an adaptation project. The first module focuses on a vulnerability assessment supplemented by a conflict analysis. The second details the role of planning and design supplemented by a pro peace analysis. The third module deals with the role of implementation and the last offers insights on monitoring and evaluation. The guide also includes further tools such as sector-specific sample questions, indicator lists, and resource lists.

To conclude: implementing an adaptation project in a conflict-sensitive way is a complex and challenging undertaking. Fragile and conflict-ridden contexts are characterised by difficult and

fast-changing political environments. These conditions may limit the possibility to apply a conflict sensitivity approach. At the same time, even the most careful application of conflict sensitivity instruments does not guarantee success. One has to accept these limitations and do what is do-able in a challenging context. It is all the more important to make sure to adhere to conflict-sensitivity principles. Continuous reflection about the consequences of project activities helps to minimise negative consequences. Mitigating new conflicts may already count as a success in fragile and conflict-affected environments.

What also becomes clear throughout the consultation process is that the guidelines require to be applied to further prove and verify their relevance and appropriateness. The fact that the guidelines have been picked up by different stakeholders after its publication in summer 2019 already points into this direction. Potential further entry points to apply the guidelines in concrete contexts are, among others:

- ▶ pilots in the framework of the International Climate Initiative of the German Ministry for the Environment and other German programs related to climate change adaptation, the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+) of the European Union, the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) under the UNFCCC and other relevant instruments for international climate finance.
- ▶ cooperation with regional organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa which is already active in the context of resilience building and climate change adaptation
- ▶ introducing the guidelines as part of the implementation of Nationally Determined Contribution in countries considered as fragile or conflict prone to inform adaptation with concrete co-benefits which can also ask for additional funding or support from international partners.
- ▶ including the guideline in relevant readiness activities of the Green Climate Fund or the Adaptation Fund to improve access to these funds.



## Zusammenfassung

Um die globale Mitteltemperatur auf nahe 1,5 Grad Celsius im Vergleich zu vorindustriellen Werten zu begrenzen ist die Verringerung der Treibhausgasemissionen die wichtigste Antwort. Da die Auswirkungen des Klimawandels in vielen Teilen der Welt bereits sichtbar sind, ist die Anpassung an die negativen Folgen des Klimawandels von entscheidender Bedeutung - insbesondere für die am stärksten vom Klimawandel betroffenen Länder. Anpassung bezieht sich auf „Umstellungen in ökologischen, sozialen oder wirtschaftlichen Systemen als Reaktion auf tatsächliche oder erwartete klimatische Reize und deren Folgen oder Auswirkungen. Anpassung bezieht sich auf Änderungen in Prozessen, Praktiken und Strukturen, um potenzielle Schäden zu mindern oder die mit dem Klimawandel verbundenen Chancen zu nutzen“ (UNFCCC 2018).

Zu den am stärksten dem Klimawandel ausgesetzten Ländern gehören viele fragile und von Konflikten betroffene Länder. Angesichts begrenzter Ressourcen und Kapazitäten sowie langanhaltender Krisen und Gewalt kann es für diese Staaten schwierig sein, Anpassungsaktivitäten anzugehen und vollständig umzusetzen, um auf diese Weise wirksam auf ihre Anfälligkeit für die Folgen des Klimawandels zu reagieren. Neben den bereits bestehenden Herausforderungen setzen in ihrer Häufigkeit und Intensität zunehmende, durch den Klimawandel verursachte, extreme Wetterereignisse wie Stürme, Dürren und Überschwemmungen fragile Länder zusätzlich unter Druck. Hierzu zählen auch langfristig ablaufende Umweltveränderungen, durch welche die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen der Bevölkerung zerstört werden, wie beispielsweise der Meeresspiegelanstieg oder die Versteppung großflächiger Gebiete. Wenn die Anpassung an den Klimawandel keine politische Priorität darstellt und ausreichend unterstützt wird, können Todesfälle, Verletzungen, weitgehende Zerstörung, wirtschaftliche Krisen und plötzliche Vertreibungen in der Folge wahrscheinlicher werden. In gleicher Weise sind die langsam einsetzenden Umweltveränderungen zu berücksichtigen, durch welche die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen der Bevölkerung zerstört werden.

Die Anpassungsbemühungen an den Klimawandel erfordern zunehmend wissenschaftliche Expertise, politische Sachkenntnis, angemessene Ressourcen und die Unterstützung der Öffentlichkeit. Viele Länder stehen bei der Beurteilung ihres Anpassungsbedarfs und der Entwicklung von Strategien und Instrumenten zur Anpassung vor erheblichen Herausforderungen und Hindernissen. Die internationale Gemeinschaft bemüht sich, diese Länder zu unterstützen. Zu diesem Zweck wurden auf sektoraler Ebene verschiedene Instrumente und Leitlinien entwickelt, um die Anpassungsplanung und -umsetzung zu erleichtern. Die spezifischen Herausforderungen der Anpassungsmaßnahmen in fragilen und von Konflikten betroffenen Umgebungen wurden jedoch kaum berücksichtigt. Überlegungen zu Frieden und Konflikt sind in der internationalen Anpassungspolitik – insbesondere was die Umsetzungsebene angeht, bisher kaum vorhanden. Zudem befinden sich Anpassungsbemühungen in den jeweiligen Ländern häufig noch in einem Anfangsstadium.

Der vorliegende Bericht soll diese Lücke schließen, indem er Leitlinien für Anpassungsmaßnahmen in fragilen und konfliktgeprägten Kontexten aufzeigt. Es wird beschrieben, wie Anpassungsprojekte in einem fragilen oder von Konflikten betroffenen Kontext entworfen und implementiert werden können. Es gibt Leitlinien vor, um sicherzustellen, dass ein Anpassungsprojekt Spannungen nicht verschärft und im Idealfall zu Frieden und Stabilität beiträgt. Ausgangspunkt für die Entwicklung der Leitlinien ist die Beobachtung, dass jedes Anpassungsprojekt die politische Dynamik beeinflusst – entweder auf eine positive oder auf eine negative Weise. Das ist insbesondere für fragile und von Konflikt betroffene Länder relevant. Ein schlecht entworfenes oder ausgeführtes Projekt kann unter Umständen zu unbeabsichtigten

Spannungen und Gewaltausbrüchen führen. Es ist daher unerlässlich, dass Anpassungsprojekte so entwickelt und umgesetzt werden, dass sie Konfliktsituationen vor Ort berücksichtigen. Idealerweise sollten sie so konzipiert und implementiert werden, dass sie zur Stabilisierung der Situation und zur Verhinderung von Konflikten beitragen.

Der Bericht beginnt mit einer Grundlagenanalyse (Kapitel 2), die den Hintergrund der Debatte über die Anpassung an den Klimawandel als Herausforderung in fragilen und konfliktträchtigen Gebieten darstellt und der Handlungsrahmen für die Nutzung des Leitfadens und der darin genannten Instrumente festgelegt. Das Kapitel zielt darauf ab, anhand von vorhandenen Leitfäden zu Konfliktsensitivität im Allgemeinen die wichtigsten Elemente eines Leitfadens für konflikt-sensitive Anpassung an den Klimawandel zu ermitteln. Ferner wird herausgearbeitet, inwiefern sich Klimaanpassung in diesen Ansätzen bereits widerspiegelt oder widerspiegeln könnte. Im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung stehen die folgenden Ansätze: „Climate Change and Conflict“ (USAID 2015), „How to guide to conflict sensitivity“ (CSC 2012) zu „Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected states and situations“ (OECD DAC 2007). Durch eine Analyse der Stärken und Schwächen können „Gute Praktiken“ in Bezug auf die Umsetzung konflikt-sensitiver Ansätze identifiziert werden. Die Analyse verdeutlicht aber auch, dass sich konflikt-sensitive Ansätze zum Klimawandel noch in einem Anfangsstadium befinden.

Im zweiten Teil des Kapitel 2 werden ausgewählte Fallstudien mit praktischem Bezug zu Konfliktsensitivität untersucht und analysiert, inwiefern Konflikte im Programm- oder Projektdesign Berücksichtigung finden. Dazu wurde ein Projekt zur Integration von Katastrophenrisikovorsorge und Konfliktprävention im Tschad, ein Hilfsprojekt für indigene Waldreservate in Papua-Neuguinea, ein Projekt zu konflikt-sensitivem Ressourcen- und Vermögensmanagement auf den Philippinen, eine Initiative zu innovativer Entwicklungsplanung für die Anpassung an den Klimawandel in Mali, ein Projekt zu Ressourcenmanagement als Ansatzpunkt für Konflikttransformation in Kolumbien und ein Projekt zur Komplementarität der Anpassung an den Klimawandel und der Konflikttransformation in Peru eingehend analysiert. Übergeordnetes Ziel der Bestandsaufnahme verschiedener Projektansätze, die als „Gute Praktiken“ angesehen werden, ist, Kernelemente eines erfolgreich umzusetzenden konflikt-sensitiven Vorhabens herauszuarbeiten. Vor dem Hintergrund der konzeptionellen und praktischen Betrachtung können so erste Bestandteile eines Leitfadens konflikt-sensitiver Anpassung formuliert werden. Dies beinhaltet Ziele, Instrumente und weitere Mittel zur Unterstützung der Umsetzung.

In Kapitel 3 werden ausgewählte Herausforderungen, Grenzen und Möglichkeiten betrachtet, um Konfliktsensitivität in Aktivitäten der Anpassung an den Klimawandel in fragilen Kontexten zu integrieren. Zunächst wird der Fokus auf verschiedene Strategien gerichtet, um sich seitens internationaler Akteurinnen und Akteure in diesen speziellen Kontexten zu engagieren (Kapitel 3.1). hie verschiedene Wege, um Fragilität zu adressieren und einen konflikt-sensitiven Ansatz anzuwenden. Unter den wesentlichen Erkenntnissen der diesbezüglichen Literatur in diesem Feld sticht zunächst die Notwendigkeit heraus, die Komplexität von Projektansätzen zu reduzieren und als Priorität vor allem die Verbesserung der Kompetenzen und der Ausbildung der Projektbeteiligten in den Blick zu nehmen. Dies beinhaltet auch, klare Zielvorgaben für das Projekt zu definieren, und realistisch bezüglich der Geschwindigkeit zu sein, mit der diese Ziele erreicht werden können. Schließlich bedarf es der Bereitschaft der internationalen Partnerorganisationen, in die Ausbildung von konflikt-sensitiven Herangehensweisen bei dem Personal vor Ort zu investieren. Die Bestandsaufnahme der Herausforderungen liefert auch Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich der Perspektiven der Zusammenarbeit mit alternativen, wesentlich nicht-staatlichen Initiativen in den fragilen Kontexten, um diese in Projektdesign und -umsetzung einzubinden.

Zusätzlich werden mögliche Ideen erörtert, um erfolgreich konfliktssensitive Ansätze zu realisieren (Kapitel 3.2). Die diesbezügliche Analyse basiert wesentlich auf bereits vorhandener Erfahrung aus der Friedens- und Entwicklungsarbeit sowie aus ausgewählten Fallstudien zu Programmen, die sich bislang als „Gute Praxis“ in dem Bereich erwiesen haben. Die Ergebnisse liefern Erkenntnisse zu Bedingungen einer erfolgreichen Umsetzung konfliktssensitiver Anpassungsmaßnahmen. Erstens kann die lokale Ebene mit allen Herausforderungen und Begrenzungen eine wichtige Rolle spielen und sollte in der Programmentwicklung gebührend berücksichtigt werden. Zweitens, eng mit dem ersten Punkt in Verbindung stehend, kann die Unterstützung von Prozessen lokaler Teilhabe dazu beitragen, lokale Beteiligte dazu in die Lage versetzen, sich konstruktiv in die Programmentwicklung einzubringen. Drittens erweist es sich als hilfreich, so weit wie möglich überparteilich aufzutreten und Prozesse zur Einbeziehung von regelmäßigen Rückmeldungen in Phasen der Programmentwicklung und –umsetzung zu etablieren. Schließlich sollten, viertens, die Rollen, die jede Partnerin und Partner in diesem Prozess einnimmt, umfassend berücksichtigt werden. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es zum Beispiel sinnvoll für internationale Partnerinnen und Partner nicht eine anleitende, sondern eine unterstützende und fazitätierende Rolle einzunehmen. In dieser Hinsicht kann ein flexibles und ergebnisoffenes Programmdesign helfen, das durch offene und transparente Kommunikationskanäle als wertvolle Stütze entsprechender Prozesse begleitet wird.

Die abschließende Betrachtung der Herausforderungen von Anpassungsprozessen in fragilen und kontextgeprägten Gebieten wendet sich der Frage zu, in welcher Weise die betroffenen Länder selbst Anpassung als möglichen Lösungsansatz ansehen, um die negativen Folgen des Klimawandels für Frieden und Sicherheit zu vermeiden bzw. zu mindern. Um diesbezüglich zu Antworten zu kommen, wird die Relevanz des Themas Klimawandel bzw. Anpassung an den Klimawandel in dem Forum betrachtet, dass sich international am prominentesten mit Fragen von Frieden und Sicherheit befasst – der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen (Kapitel 3.3). Der Sicherheitsrat entwickelt sich zunehmend zu einem bedeutenden Forum, um die Sicherheitsimplikationen des Klimawandels zu thematisieren.

Die Autoren analysieren, warum eine Mehrheit des Sicherheitsrats den Klimawandel als Sicherheitsbedrohung ansieht und identifizieren wesentliche Rahmen und Narrativstränge, die während der Debatten genutzt werden. Dabei ist anzumerken, dass sich – verglichen zu anderen Debatten des Sicherheitsrats – eine hohe Anzahl an Staaten in die Debatten 2007 und 2011 eingebracht haben. Dabei sind allerdings fragile Staaten nicht in gleichem Maße repräsentiert, die ggf. noch zusätzliche Impulse für konkrete Maßnahmen zur frühzeitigen Vermeidung von klimawandelbezogenen Sicherheitsrisiken geben könnten. Die nicht-permanente Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands im Sicherheitsrat 2019 und 2020 bietet diesbezüglich eine hilfreiche Gelegenheit, um Partnerschaften mit fragilen Staaten einzugehen und deren Perspektive prominenter in die Debatten um Klimawandel und Sicherheit einzubringen. Um ein stärkeres Engagement von Repräsentanten aus fragilen Staaten anzustoßen, könnten zudem auf bilateraler Ebene gemeinsame Erörterungen initiiert werden, wie die Anpassung an den Klimawandel gezielt zur Minimierung von Bedrohungen genutzt werden könnte.

Im Rahmen eines umfassenden Expertenkonsultationsprozesses zur Einbeziehung von Erkenntnissen und externen Perspektiven verschiedener Stakeholder wurden drei Workshops organisiert. In diesen wurden vorläufige Ergebnisse dieses Berichts präsentiert und diskutiert. Die einzelnen Ergebnisse dieser über die gesamte Projektdauer verteilten Konsultationen werden in Kapitel 4 und im Annex näher ausgeführt.

Der erste Workshop widmete sich verschiedenen Kriterien für konfliktssensitive Anpassung an den Klimawandel und erörterte Fragen zu Zielen, Instrumenten und Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten konfliktssensitiver Anpassungsansätze. Dabei wurde deutlich, dass sowohl ein regelmäßiger Wissens- und Erfahrungsaustausch als auch eine Übertragung der Ansätze in die entsprechende



Sprache der Klima- und Umweltpolitik zu den Voraussetzungen für konfliktssensitive Anpassung gehören. Konfliktsensitive Ansätze können einen wichtigen Beitrag zu Anpassungsvorhaben leisten, wenn die unterschiedlichen Zielsetzungen klar formuliert sind, die angewandten Methoden und Instrumente sich gegenseitig ergänzen und der übergreifende Prozess kontextspezifisch angelegt, partizipativ ausgerichtet, langfristig orientiert und flexibel gestaltet ist. Je nach Kontext müssen verschiedene Faktoren wie der kulturelle Hintergrund des Personals, möglicher Widerstand gegen ausgewählte Methoden und Erklärungsansätze, Sicherheitsstandards in Hochrisikoländern und der zeitaufwändige Aufbau von Austausch- und Lernplattformen bedacht werden. Die Einbindung politischer Partnerinnen und Partner und die Berücksichtigung lokaler, kultureller Legitimationskonzepte sind die Schlüssel zu einer partizipativen Gestaltung von Stakeholder-Konsultationsprozessen bei der Erarbeitung und Durchführung eines erfolgreichen, konfliktssensitiven Anpassungsansatzes.

Die zweite Veranstaltung erfolgte im Rahmen der COP23 in Bonn und mit Beteiligung verschiedener Vertreterinnen und Vertreter, die konkret in die Umsetzung von Klima- und Entwicklungspolitik in der Praxis involviert sind. Die Diskussion lieferte hilfreiche Einblicke zu den Zusammenhängen zwischen Anpassung, Klimawandel und damit verbundenen Sicherheitsrisiken. Festzuhalten ist, dass konfliktssensitive Projekte per se sehr komplex und nicht immer vollständig realisierbar sind. Umso wichtiger ist ein umsichtiges Vorgehen bei der Übertragung oder Anwendung dieses Konzepts. Um die Anwendung konfliktssensitiver Anpassungsstrategien zu verbessern, könnte sich die Einrichtung und Förderung eines „Community of Practice“-Netzwerks aus erfahrenen Expertinnen und Experten als vorteilhaft erweisen. Eine der größten Herausforderungen stellt die Bereitstellung und Mobilisierung der notwendigen finanziellen, technischen und personellen Ressourcen dar, insbesondere im Hinblick auf fragile Staaten, die besonders von den Folgen des Klimawandels betroffen sind, jedoch nur bedingt Zugang zu (finanziellen) Ressourcen finden. Zur Erörterung dieser und weiterer praktischer Fragen im Zusammenhang mit konfliktssensitiver Anpassung vor Ort wurde ein dritter Workshop durchgeführt.

Auf dem abschließenden, an die Planetary Security Conference 2017 angegliederten Workshop diskutierten Repräsentantinnen und Repräsentanten der Europäischen Kommission, der Friedens- und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Regierungsvertretende sowie Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler praktische Erfahrungen aus diesem Bereich, die auch in die in diesem Bericht erarbeiteten Leitlinien einfließen. Dabei wurde deutlich, dass die in Sicherheitsimplikationen resultierenden Auswirkungen von Naturkatastrophen und Klimawandel nur bedingt in Strategiedokumenten Widerhall finden bzw. selten tatsächlich in der Praxis umgesetzt werden. Um diese Lücke sowohl in Theorie als auch Praxis zu schließen, empfiehlt es sich, die Mittelzuweisung für Projekte in fragilen Kontexten stets konfliktssensitiv zu gestalten. Dies könnte durch eine effektivere Kommunikation der Vorteile konfliktssensitiver Maßnahmen anhand von „Good-Practice“-Beispielen gefördert werden. Auch die Entwicklung sektorspezifischer Strategien und die konsequente Einbeziehung lokal agierender Initiativen in Planungs- und Umsetzungsabläufe kann dazu beitragen, mit den unterschiedlichen Ansätzen zu konfliktssensitiver Anpassung gezielter auf die Bedürfnisse und Kapazitäten vor Ort eingehen zu können. Zur stärkeren Integration betroffener Gemeinschaften sollte zudem überlegt werden, ob und wie das Wissen und das finanzielle Potenzial von Diaspora-Organisationen und sogenannten "Migrant Self-Organisations" (also Organisationen, die von Migrierenden selbst gegründet worden sind) besser genutzt werden könnten, um fragile Staaten oder die Erschließung weiterer Finanzierungsquellen für (konfliktssensitive) Anpassungsprojekte zu unterstützen.

In Kapitel 5 werden einzelne Elemente des Leitfadens für konfliktssensitive Anpassung präsentiert – basierend auf den wesentlichen Einsichten der Kapitel 2 bis 4. Der Leitfaden, der

als eigene Publikation im Sommer 2019 veröffentlicht wurde und in diesem Endbericht nur kurz mit seinen wesentlichen Elementen vorgestellt wird, richtet sich an Planerinnen und Planer sowie Projektmanagerinnen und Projektmanager, die an der Konzeption und Umsetzung eines Anpassungsprojekts in fragilen oder von Konflikten betroffenen Kontexten beteiligt sind. Dazu gehören Geld- und Kreditgebende, politische Entscheidungsinstanzen der Zentral- und Kommunalverwaltung, Nichtregierungsorganisationen und andere Durchführungsorganisationen und deren Mitglieder vor Ort. Ziel ist es, Planerinnen und Planer sowie Projektmanagerinnen und Projektmanager dafür zu sensibilisieren, wie ihre Interventionen - auf unbeabsichtigte Weise - mit Konflikten interagieren oder interagieren könnten. Der Leitfaden soll auch dazu anregen, über Möglichkeiten zur Verhinderung negativer Auswirkungen auf die Konfliktdynamik nachzudenken. Darüber hinaus richtet sich der Leitfaden an die weitere Gemeinschaft der Planerinnen und Planer sowie Projektmanagerinnen und Projektmanager aus der Friedens- und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.

Der Leitfaden ist bewusst allgemein gehalten, das heißt, er ist weder präskriptiv, noch bietet er in seiner jetzigen Form eine eingehende Behandlung politikspezifischer Probleme und Herausforderungen. Er stellt deshalb keine auf alle Situationen anwendbare Vorlage dar. Dies trägt dem Umstand Rechnung, dass jedes Projekt, jede Region, jedes Land in einen einzigartigen Kontext eingebettet ist und sich auf ganz eigene Weise entwickeln. Die strategischen Fragen und Prozesse, die es zu befolgen gilt, unterscheiden sich daher im Einzelfall. Dementsprechend muss der Leitfaden auf unterschiedliche Bedürfnisse und Zielgruppen zugeschnitten werden. Die aufgeführten Instrumente und Methoden beruhen hauptsächlich auf Richtlinien und Rahmenbedingungen aus den Bereichen der humanitären Hilfe sowie der Friedens- und Entwicklungsarbeit, da die Pionierarbeit zu Konfliktsensitivität von Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler sowie Praktizierende aus diesen Bereichen stammt. Der Leitfaden zielt darauf ab, bereits vorhandenes Wissen zu nutzen und wurde durch weitere verfügbare Erkenntnisse ergänzt.

Der hier zusammengefasste Leitfaden besteht aus vier Modulen, die eine detaillierte, praktische Schritt-für-Schritt-Anleitungen bieten, um dazu beizutragen, Konfliktsensitivität in die Entwicklung und Umsetzung eines Anpassungsprojekts integriert werden kann. Das erste Modul fokussiert auf die Rolle von Vulnerabilitätsanalysen und enthält ein Unterabschnitt zu Risikoanalysen. Das zweite Modul befasst sich mit Planung und Design von konfliktsensitiven Projekten, wozu auch eine Pro-Peace Analyse beigefügt wird. Modul 3 widmet sich der Implementierung und 4 Ansätzen des Monitorings und der Evaluierung. Der Anhang enthält ergänzende Informationen und Instrumente, die die praktische Umsetzung der Leitlinien unterstützen. Dazu gehören sektorspezifische Beispielfragen, Indikatoren- und Ressourcenlisten.

In der Gesamtschau zeigt sich, dass die Umsetzung eines Anpassungsprojekts unter Berücksichtigung konfliktsensitiver Gesichtspunkte ein komplexes und herausforderndes Unterfangen darstellt. Fragile und konfliktreiche Umfelder kennzeichnen sich durch ein schwieriges und sich schnell veränderndes politisches Umfeld. Diese Umstände können die Anwendung eines konfliktsensitiven Ansatzes einschränken. Gleichzeitig ist auch der sorgfältigste Einsatz von konfliktsensitiven Instrumenten kein Erfolgsgarant. Es ist wichtig, diese Einschränkungen zu akzeptieren und sich darauf zu konzentrieren, was in einem schwierigen Umfeld möglich ist. Umso wichtiger ist es, die Anwendung konfliktsensitiver Prinzipien anzustreben. Kontinuierliche Überlegungen zu den Folgen von Projektaktivitäten tragen dazu bei, negative Konsequenzen zu minimieren. Das Verhindern neuer Konflikte kann in fragilen und von Konflikten betroffenen Umgebungen bereits als Erfolg gelten.

Es zeigt sich schließlich auch - insbesondere während des Konsultationsprozesses zu dem Leitfaden-, dass der Leitfaden vor allem dann relevant werden kann, wenn er konkret in

verschiedenen Kontexten angewendet und ausprobiert wird. Die Tatsache, dass er bereits nach der Veröffentlichung im Sommer 2019 in verschiedenen Kontexten aufgegriffen wurde, weist in diese Richtung. Mögliche weitere Einstiegspunkte in dieser Richtung sind u.a.:

- ▶ Pilotvorhaben im Rahmen der Internationalen Klimainitiative; der Global Climate Change Alliance plus (GCCA+) der EU, des Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) oder anderer Instrumente der internationalen Klimafinanzierung;
- ▶ Kooperation mit regionalen Organisationen und Initiativen wie die Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Ostafrika, die sich bereits aktiv im Kontext von resilienzstärkenden Maßnahmen und Klimaanpassungsmaßnahmen einbringen;
- ▶ Einbringung des Leitfadens als Teil der nationalen Klimabeiträge in fragilen und konfliktgeprägten Ländern, um die entsprechenden Anpassungsprozesse über konkrete Co-Benefits zu informieren, die auch für zusätzliches internationales Funding relevant werden können;
- ▶ Einbeziehung des Leitfadens in sogenannte Readiness-Aktivitäten des Green Climate Fund oder des Adaptation Fund, um den Zugang zu diesen Fonds zu verbessern.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

Among the countries most vulnerable to climate change are many fragile and conflict-affected countries. Given limited resources and capacities, protracted crises and violence it can be challenging for fragile and conflict-affected states to fully engage and implement adaptation activities and, thus, to effectively manage vulnerabilities. In addition to already existing challenges for fragile countries the increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events caused by climate change such as storms, droughts and floods can put additional pressure on the coping capacities. As a result, deaths, injuries, widespread destruction, economic disruption and sudden displacement can become more likely if adaptation to climate change is not a political priority and sufficiently supported.

Efforts to adapt to climate change increasingly require scientific expertise, political know-how, appropriate resources and public support. Many countries face significant challenges and barriers to assessing their adaptation needs and developing strategies and tools for adaptation. The international community is seeking to support those countries. To do so, various tools and guidance documents were developed at the sectoral level to facilitate adaption planning and implementation. However, the specific challenges for adaptation programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts have hardly been addressed. Considerations of peace and conflict have been largely absent from international adaptation governance. As a result, adaptation efforts in respective countries is often still in its early stage.

## 1.2 Objectives

This report aims at addressing this gap by offering guidance for adaptation programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. To this end the authors develop a guide outlining how to design and implement an adaptation project in a fragile or conflict-affected context. It provides guidance to ensure that an adaptation project does not exacerbate tensions and, ideally, contributes to peace and stability. Starting point for the development of the guide is the observation that any adaptation project has an impact, either positive or negative, on political dynamics. This is especially relevant for countries which are fragile or conflict-affected. If poorly designed or executed a project might unintentionally lead to tensions, even an outbreak of violence. It is therefore imperative that adaptation projects are developed and implemented in a way that they are sensitive to conflictual situations on the ground. Ideally, they should be designed and implemented in a way that they contribute to stabilise the situation and prevent conflicts.

## 1.3 Approach and methods

This report consists of a compilation of different (analytical, conceptual and empirical) insights on conflict-sensitive adaptation to provide a sound basis for the guide. Chapter two starts with a scoping to provide the background to the debate on adaptation to climate change as a challenge in fragile and conflict prone areas. It also offers a framework in which any guidance and tools can be used. To this end a stocktaking of conflict sensitivity and adaptation in theory and practice is prepared through a review of existing guides on conflict sensitivity in general and how adaptation to climate change is or can be reflected by these approaches. In the second step of this scoping, the selected case studies on conflict sensitivity in practice are examined and it is analysed in which way conflicts are reflected in the program or project design.

In chapter three, selected challenges, limitations and opportunities for integrating conflict sensitivity in climate change adaptation activities in fragile contexts are explored. First, the focus is directed to examine strategies for engagement in fragile contexts by international actors. Second, the role of guiding ideas that can serve as major stepping stones for successfully implementing conflict-sensitive adaptation is explored. Third, the relevance of fragile states in discussing climate change impacts and climate change adaptation as an element of peace and stability based on the debate on the topic in the United Nations Security Council is analysed. The aim is to learn more about the ways these states can take a more prominent role in requesting early action on the security implications of climate change.

In chapter four the results of a broader expert consultation process are presented. This process has been based on national and international workshops to incorporate insights and external views of different stakeholders. During this process, the preliminary findings of this report were presented and discussed. In addition, the consultation was used to offer entry points to build a community of practice. The individual outcomes of these consultations are presented throughout the chapter and fed into the finalisation of the guide.

In chapter five the authors present elements of the resulting guide on conflict sensitive adaptation based on the insights gathered during the chapter two to four. The guide addresses planner and project managers involved in designing and implementing an adaptation project in fragile or conflict-affected contexts. This includes donors, practitioners from central and local governments, non-governmental organisations and other implementing agencies. It seeks to sensitise these users how their interventions could be or have been interacting with conflict in unintentional ways and to stimulate thinking how to prevent negative impacts on conflict dynamics. The main part of the guide is structured along a typical cycle for climate change adaptation projects and comprises four modules (vulnerability assessment, planning & design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). Each module starts with a brief overview of key steps (guidelines) explained in the module and offers guidance on supplementary information and tools provided in the Annex.

## **1.4 References Chapter 1**

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## 2 Stocktaking: Conflict sensitivity and adaptation in theory and practice

To identify key design elements of the guide on conflict-sensitive adaptation the project team reviewed existing guides on conflict sensitive adaptation for strengths and weaknesses, and sought to distil good practices when it comes to the implementation of conflict sensitive adaptation. The insights of the review were then summarised in a brief position paper that was discussed with a group of experts for further validation and input.

A key outcome of this research was that there exists no common, widely accepted methodology how to assess and address the links between climate change, conflict and fragility. Research revealed that conflict-sensitive approaches to climate change are still at the very beginning. The most comprehensive guide how to address climate fragility risk is arguably from USAID and was published in 2015. There is no necessity to re-invent the wheel. Substantial work has been done in the peace and conflict community as well as in development cooperation. For instance, in 2012 the so-called Conflict Sensitivity consortium of NGOs developed a detailed and comprehensive guide how to realise conflict-sensitive projects. Also an OECD report from 2007 provides substantial input how to design and implement programmes and projects on fragile contexts. In addition to the USAID guide, the project team decided therefore to review the “How-to-guide” by the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium and the OECD-DAC’s for their strengths and weaknesses.

To gain additional input how to design the conflict sensitivity guide, the project team researched and reviewed good practice examples of conflict sensitive adaptation. Out of practical reasons the research was limited to projects financed by the International Climate Initiative (IKI) and located in G7+ countries, i.e. countries which describe themselves as fragile and conflict prone. Based on expert consultations and interviews with project managers the project team identified six cases that stand out in terms of how conflict risks were integrated into programming. The cases were selected based on expert recommendations taking into account geographic and thematic diversification.

This chapter presents the insights of this stocktaking. Section 2.1 highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the USAID’s Technical Report on Climate Change and Conflict (2015), the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium’s How-to guide to conflict sensitivity (2012) and the OECD’s Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007). All information was extracted from the original reports if not reported otherwise. Section 2.2 presents six cases of good practice on conflict sensitivity. It outlines experiences and lessons learned when it comes to the implementation of conflict sensitivity. Section 2.3 ties the insights from section 2.1 and 2.2 together. The summary was presented as a position paper in the context of the expert consultations (see Chapter 4).

### 2.1 Status of conflict sensitivity guidelines

#### 2.1.1 USAID (2015): Climate Change and Conflict

The USAID report “Climate Change and Conflict” provides a set of guidelines how to develop a programme that is sensitive to both climate as well as peace-building objectives. The focus of the report is conflict analysis. It outlines a framework for a “climate-sensitive conflict analysis”, an analysis that considers both climate as well as conflict dynamics and illustrates how this framework could be applied. Overall, the report provides a number of suggestions what to do and to a lesser extent how to do it.



### 2.1.1.1 Conduct a “climate-sensitive conflict analysis”

**Task 1:** Analyse the conflict

**Task 2:** Build scenarios how climate change and conflict may intersect in the future

USAID proposes to conduct a “climate-sensitive conflict analysis”. A “climate-sensitive conflict analysis” is an in-depth assessment that considers not only the conflict itself but also how climate change might impact conflict-relevant factors in the future. USAID suggests proceeding in two steps.

As a first step, it recommends to conduct a “basic” or classic conflict analysis. This basic conflict analysis illuminates the *context* (a range of geographic, political and social factors), the *institutional performance* (formal and informal rules and institutions in place) and *key actors* (individuals and organisations have resources to lead collective action) relevant to a conflict. USAID refers to its own *Conflict Assessment Framework* (CAF 2.0) for further guidance.

As a second step, based on the analysis of the conflict dynamics, USAID suggests to build scenarios. Goal of the scenario-building is to explore how climate change might alter the conflict situation in the future. Key of the scenario-building activity is to find hypothetical answers how climate change might impact context (e.g. water supply, agricultural practices), the institutional performance (e.g. health system, infrastructure) and key actors’ interests and attitudes (e.g. exploitation, violence) in the future.

USAID conceives climate change thereby as a *trend multiplier* that exacerbates current trends, conditions and hazards. USAID assumes that climate change often contributes to conflicts in three related ways:

- 1) Direct resource competition through relative scarcity or abundance of specific resources
- 2) Increased grievances over relative deprivation and increasing mistrust between groups through changes in relative prosperity
- 3) Complex crisis and increased human insecurity through intensification of natural disasters, which may have socio-economic impacts

USAID suggests that these three assumptions are a good starting point for scenario-building. Yet, it claims that the impact of climate change is ultimately an open, highly contingent question. Its effect will be mediated, amongst other, by the population’s exposure, sensitivity, adaptive capacity which in turn will be mediated by class, occupation, gender, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation. The USAID report illustrates a number of sample questions to facilitate scenario-building (e.g. a series of droughts reduces water supply in an already arid region: What are the farmers’ and pastoralists’ attitudes toward one another?).

Once done with the analysis USAID suggests inseminating the insights of the analysis into entire programme cycles.

### 2.1.1.2 Ensure that all activities are “conflict sensitive”

**Task:** Conduct an impact assessment

USAID suggest that all climate-related projects and activities should be “conflict-sensitive”. The foundational assumption is that all climate change mitigation and adaption measures themselves could unintentionally contribute to the existing or future conflict dynamics. The allocation of financial resources for a climate-related project (e.g. incentive payment to stop deforestation), for instance, could be used by key conflict actors and then be used to marginalise other groups or fuel other grievances. USAID seeks to mitigate these unintended consequences, applying the ‘do-no-harm’ principle, a principle which has been applied in the development, humanitarian and peacebuilding sector.

Applying the ‘do-no-harm’ principle USAID suggests that “all programme activities are designed and periodically reviewed in the light of the changing conflict dynamics to ensure that (1) they do not inadvertently create or exacerbate conflict, (2) they factor in the possible impact of existing or potential conflict on staff, implementing partners and the activities themselves, (3) seek appropriate opportunities to mitigate tensions and consolidate peace and reconciliation.” (p.25)

USAID does not develop own guidelines how to ensure the conflict-sensitivity of programmes but refers to established frameworks of the *World Development Report 2011* and the *OECD-Development Assistance Committee’s* guidance from the International Network on Conflict and Fragility for country-wide programmes (*Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*) and to the *Conflict Sensitivity’s Consortium’s* “How to Guide Conflict Sensitivity” for projects at the micro level. It points out that a specific conflict-sensitive approach to climate change mitigation and adaption measures is still at the very beginning.

USAID suggests, amongst other, a tight monitoring and evaluation system. Yet, it might be noteworthy that USAID does not explicitly pay attention to monitoring and evaluation and/or refer to guidelines that do so (see for instance, the *Monitoring and Evaluating Conflict Sensitivity* Guideline by DFID).

### **2.1.1.3 Approach adaptation and peace-building holistically**

**Task:** Combine or leverage mitigation and adaption measures to build peace

USAID promotes an integrated approach between environmental and peace-building efforts and suggests seizing opportunities to achieve both climate resilience and peace, where possible. It claims, for instance, that an environmental project be structured in a way to promote exchanges between divided communities, build relationships and foster trust. Frequent interactions could build capacity for negotiation, mediation and dispute resolution and thus contribute to peace or/and taming tensions and violent conflict. Key element of such a project would be an inclusive or participatory approach that aims at consensus-building, deliberative dialogue between various actors and local-level capacity building. But also peacebuilding projects – projects primarily concerned with changing attitudes, behaviours and structures for violence – could be structured in a way to contribute to mitigate and adapt to climate change (e.g. conservation of energy, post-conflict collection and destruction of weapons). USAID provides, however, little guidance how climate change and peacebuilding projects/programmes can be leveraged and complemented in practice. Moreover, it does not provide any indication at which stage these opportunities could and should be seized.

### **2.1.1.4 Strengths and limitations:**

Taken together, USAID puts emphasis on an integrated analysis. It provides a lot of guidance on how to conduct a “climate sensitive conflict analysis”. It illustrates sample questions for the development of climate-sensitive conflict scenarios. Yet, it provides little guidance on how to feed the insights of this analysis into the actual programming cycle. Also, USAID provides little guidance on how to ensure that all activities are “conflict sensitive”. It refers to ‘established’ frameworks by other key agencies. Finally, USAID suggests that it does make sense to combine and leverage climate change and peacebuilding projects. Yet, also here it offers little insight on how this strategic leveraging can be achieved *in practice*.

### **2.1.2 CSS (2012): How to guide to conflict sensitivity**

The “How to”-guide was developed by a consortium of 35 humanitarian, development and peacebuilding and multi-mandate NGOs operating in Kenya, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and the UK



in 2012. Its key goal is to offer practical guidance how projects/programmes in the development, humanitarian and peacebuilding sector can be implemented in a “conflict-sensitive” manner. The report offers detailed guidance on different stages throughout the programme cycle, namely the assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation stage. It offers not only suggestions when and how to conduct a conflict assessment, but also details how to link the analysis into project design and implementation. Moreover, it highlights critical issues to pay attention to when implementing a conflict-sensitive policy/programme and how to assess and build-up institutional capacity for conflict sensitivity. The work of the consortium is based on the experiences and ‘lessons learned’ of a number of humanitarian and peacebuilding projects in three conflict-ridden African countries.

#### **2.1.2.1 Conduct a conflict analysis**

**Task:** Analyse the conflict

According to the Consortium the conflict analysis should focus on (1) conflict profile, (2) conflict causes (3) key actors and (4) conflict dynamics. The guide offers a number of sample questions to guide the conflict analysis. As methods of choice it recommends desk research, surveys, expert interviews, community consultations, workshops with staff, partner and other relevant actors. The Consortium suggests having an internal project team or consultants to conduct the analysis and involving key stakeholders (e.g. project staff, partners, peer organisations, local communities) in the analysis for their insights. This “participatory” conflict analysis should be realised at the earliest stage possible. It mitigates biases early and ensures a shared understanding of the conflict situation.

#### **2.1.2.2 Ensure the project is “conflict sensitive”**

**Task 1:** Conduct an impact assessment and revise the project design accordingly

The Consortium claims, when designing the project, to review all key parameters of the project (e.g. What? Who? Where? When? How?) in view of its link to the conflict. It recommends to (1) assess the risks and opportunities of the project linked to the conflict, (2) identify potential for changes in the project design to limit negative outcome and (3) modify the project design accordingly. The Consortium suggests thereby a participatory approach by involving not only project staff but also community members and partners at the design stage to prevent biases and identify opportunities linked to implementation. Moreover, it recommends including a few budget lines to embed the conflict analysis in the implementation (e.g. budget lines for updating conflict analysis, participatory monitoring/regular reflection, feedback).

**Task 2:** Choose implementation activities that re-inforce or contribute to community cohesion

The Consortium suggests intensifying initial consultations to secure political buy-in and create local ownership. It provides some guidance on staff recruitment, highlighting that implementing agency should consider the impact the new staff could have on existing tensions (e.g. because of ethical, religious, political affiliations etc.). The Consortium also recommends sensitising communities about conflict-sensitivity and the project through capacity-building. These workshops and trainings would help to foster understanding, provide insights why some choices are made and allows for feedback and thus for adjustment and improvement.

**Task 3:** Monitor the conflict context and the interaction between the project and the conflict

Implementers should analyse carefully (1) to what extent the project/policy is achieving its goals, (2) to what extent there are any changes in the conflict context, (3) if the project/programme is affected by the evolution and/or certain dynamics of the conflict, (4) if there are any unintended/unforeseen impacts of the project. Key is to develop a number of

indicators. The Consortium also suggests ensuring that the monitoring itself is conflict sensitive (e.g. various ethnic groups, empowered and marginalised groups are consulted).

### **2.1.2.3 Address the societal and state-society dimension**

**Task:** Use participatory approaches throughout the various stages

The Consortium points out to use a coupled top-down/bottom-up approach. It suggests involving various groups throughout the project cycle (donors, governments, local communities). An early involvement of target groups (local communities) secures thereby local ownership and reduces the risk of future political tensions. The guide points out that it is important to recognise the various local communities' positions. It claims it is also important to involve local communities in decision-making processes, as decisions typically affect the distribution of resources. Implementation activities should be designed to allow for building up trust and thus positive relationships (e.g. through involvement in specific activities, exchanges etc.). At the same time an approach that focuses too much on local communities ignores the position and possibilities of other relevant actors relevant to success (e.g. governments and donors), argues the Consortium. In general terms, transparency, accountability and constant and safe spaces for feedback for all stakeholders are key.

### **2.1.2.4 Built up institutional capacity for conflict-sensitivity**

**Task:** Strengthen capacity to understand and manage conflicts

The Consortium recommends strengthening the capacity of both the implementing project agency and the local agency/organisation to understand and manage conflict risks. From the implementing project agencies this requires a critical capacity self-assessment, including a review of staff roles and competencies, the adjustment of partnership policies, procurement policies, recruitment policies etc. In terms of the implementing agency – local organisation relations it requires, amongst other, trainings/workshops, safe spaces for feedback to ensure knowledge transmission. Opportunities should be sought to feed that knowledge into organisational plans. The overall idea is to reinforce an organisation's commitment to conflict-sensitivity.

### **2.1.2.5 Strengths and limitations:**

The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium offers a detailed guide on how to realise a conflict-sensitive project. It provides a lot of input on how to link the conflict analysis to various programming cycles. It comes up with various key questions to consider in each stage. It provides comparatively little guidance on how to monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity. For instance, it does not discuss which evaluation criteria are useful in evaluating conflict sensitivity, how to design indicators or how to measure and evaluate conflict sensitivity. Also, given its origin in the humanitarian and peace-building area/sector it provides little insights on how a conflict-sensitive approach in climate change adaption projects could look like, respectively if such an approach would need to look any different.

## **2.1.3 OECD-DAC (2007): Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected states and situations**

OECD-DAC's report from 2007 is of more general nature as it provides principles for programming fragile and conflict-affected states and situations. Although comparatively old, the principles are still of relevance as they continue to shape development approaches in various sectors. Out of pragmatic reasons this section condenses the ten principles to four and reviews their practical application in light of the OECD's own report from 2011.

### **2.1.3.1 Take the context as a starting point**

OECD-DAC recommends that programming must be context-sensitive. That means, practitioners should pay particular attention to the specific local situation (e.g. protracted crisis, post-conflict crisis, deteriorating situation), institutional capacity (e.g. resources, legitimacy), trends and vulnerabilities when developing and implementing programmes. They should avoid one-size-fits all approaches, in particular fragile situations and as such start off with a sound political analysis to adapt instruments.

### **2.1.3.2 Ensure that all activities are “conflict-sensitive”**

Any political interventions create unintended political consequences that may worsen problems or even create new divisions and tensions. To prevent secondary negative impacts, the OECD-DAC recommends that interventions follow the ‘do-no-harm’ principle. Interventions should be based on a sound conflict and impact analysis. This requires analysis of relevant conflict causes and consultations with local actors to understand dynamics, power and distributional struggles and create measures that take local needs into account. Transparency and accountability are thereby of utmost importance.

### **2.1.3.3 Focus on good governance and capacity-building**

Effective, efficient and legitimate institutions are key for good governance. Therefore programmes should support what is commonly understood as “good governance”, that is, promote the rule of law, democratic governance, human rights and civil society engagement. Access and resources should be arranged in an inclusive, equitable manner. Various stakeholders should be involved. This is important to prevent new divisions and or prevent long-term fragility and promote stable societies. Moreover, the OECD-DAC recommends strengthening the capacities of the states to deliver the core functions. The underpinning idea is to ensure that states are capable to fulfil public objectives such as security and justice, growth and poverty-reduction; in other words, it is about making sure that states have for instance, sufficient knowledge, revenues, technology to actually implement policies. International actors should be aware of limitations of governance, focus on those institutions that work (including potential informal networks and institutions while taking into account possible stumbling blocks and provide necessary assistance to not weaken existing governance structures and thus contribute to an illegitimate and ineffective state.

### **2.1.3.4 Take time and remain flexible**

The OECD-DAC argues that fragility and low capacity requires a long-term and committed engagement. The building of capacity is at least a 10-year undertaking. A volatility of engagement may have destabilising effects. At the same time, however, programmes must be flexible enough to adjust them quickly to changing situations on the ground. Fragile, conflict-ridden contexts are by its very definition highly unstable. It recommends long-term objectives but procedural flexibility.

### **2.1.3.5 Strengths and limitations**

At the core of the principles is a new approach in development, one that takes local specifics and local actors seriously. They represented a paradigm shift in the provision of aid and assistance. Yet, a 2011 report by the OECD highlighted that the international performance against the principles were seriously off-track<sup>1</sup>. Most programmes were partially or fully off-track. In other words, little progress was made. The report claimed that while development actors recognised

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<sup>1</sup> The OECD report is entitled “International Engagement in Fragile States – Can’t We Do Better?” and is available here: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/IEFS.pdf>

the importance to take the local context seriously they still did not necessarily profound and systematic analyses. Also, there was still a tendency of “pre-packaging” programmes instead of developing them participatory. Moreover, state-building efforts were concentrated too much on the central and executive level; support for civil society lagged behind. Furthermore, support for societal exchanges was rather limited. The report also claimed that development actors do not systematically ensure that programmes are conflict-sensitive; that is, they do not systematically monitor the (un-)intended impact. Programme objectives remain short-term.

## **2.2 Case studies on conflict sensitivity in practice**

### **2.2.1 Chad Integrating disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention**

#### **2.2.1.1 What is the programme/project about?**

PRCPT (Programme to strengthen resilience and peaceful coexistence in Chad) is implemented by GIZ on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) with major funding from the European Union. The project covers the period 05/2016 to 12/2019 and will be active in several regions of Chad: Hadjer-Lamis, Chari-Banguirmi, Mayo-Kebbi Est and Mayo-Kebbi Ouest, as well as Sila and Salamat. It builds upon an earlier disaster risk reduction project that GIZ conducted between 2013 and 2016, which focused on the Sila region.

#### **2.2.1.2 What is the (potential) conflict context?**

The Republic of Chad is facing a number of interrelated social, economic and political challenges. Lack of personnel and financial resources are major constraints to the ability of public administrations to deliver essential services to the Chadian population – including provisions for the management of local conflicts. This pertains especially to rural areas, where a large part of the population lives below the poverty line and lacks access to schools, health centres and clean drinking water.

Moreover, recent and ongoing violent conflicts in neighbouring Nigeria, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Libya and Sudan have resulted in a growing number of refugees in Chad. These live in extremely precarious conditions, sometimes competing with local populations over access to essential resources such as water.

These problems are compounded by climatic hazards, such as droughts and floods, which are also felt in regions where PRCPT is active. Rural people, who represent roughly 80% of the population in Chad, are particularly vulnerable to these extreme events, which destroy crops, compromise water resources and lead to accelerated degradation of soils. The consequences are not only increased scarcity of essential natural resources – with the associated risk of conflicts over their distribution – but also a higher risk that destitute farmers and herders will join the ranks of radical groups that offer food and money to their followers. The nexus of climate vulnerability, poor economic prospects and limited administrative capacities in Chad is thus highly relevant from a security perspective; especially in border regions that are close to conflict areas in neighbouring countries.

#### **2.2.1.3 In which way is the conflict reflected in the programme/project design?**

To tackle the above issues PRCPT pursues an integrated approach, which simultaneously aims to strengthen the capacities of local administrations and civil society, create income earning opportunities for vulnerable people and augment the ability of rural communities to prepare for and respond to extreme weather events. Moreover, the project contains provisions to explicitly prevent violence by supporting local peace initiatives and managing conflicts (e.g. over access to

natural resources). The project thus contributes both directly and indirectly to alleviating factors that increase fragility in Chad.

Prior to the project a Peace and Conflict Assessment was conducted in line with the methodological framework of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (GIZ 2014a). The assessment comprised a variety of approaches, including desk research, interviews with local officials (e.g. governor of the region and *chefs de canton*), questionnaires, and focus groups in different villages. A workshop was organised to communicate the assessment's findings and obtain further feedback from key stakeholders. The results of the assessment were then utilised to inform planning and include adequate conflict indicators in the monitoring system of PRCPT. One of the findings of the assessment, for example, was that new water infrastructures and granaries needed not only to be placed in an economically efficient way, but also so as to allow equitable access and avoid conflicts between different villages.

Furthermore, the project emphasises the participation of and communication between stakeholders at the local and regional level. This way, potential conflicts of interest related to project planning and implementation can potentially be identified and addressed at an early stage/in due time. For example, PRCPT involves regular meetings with local and regional officials and works towards the overall strengthening of communication channels for public and civil society actors. Moreover, project activities are accompanied by local supporters who live in target areas. PRCPT also provides training and support to local committees that manage disaster risks at the village level. Given that PRCPT is still at an early stage, the effectiveness of these measures has yet to be evaluated.

#### **2.2.1.4 What are potential take away messages?**

Integrated approaches such as PRCPT are well suited to addressing interrelated issues that directly or indirectly contribute to fragility. Particularly in settings where climate-related hazards risk contributing to social tensions and violence, a combination of disaster risk reduction and peace-building activities can be very effective. However, ensuring the coherence of project elements is essential in order to profit from synergies across activities and sectors of intervention. To ensure this coherence, time and resources need to be allocated to facilitate communication between all actors involved in and affected by the project.

Moreover, interdependent project components need to be tackled simultaneously. For example, PRCPT provides support to village committees that manage disaster risks. Yet, membership of these committees does not generate any income and their viability will be at risk once the support from PRCPT ends. It is therefore important that members of these committees can rely on other components of PRCPT that facilitate access to alternative earning opportunities over the long term.

### **2.2.2 Papua New Guinea: YUS Indigenous Forest Reserve**

#### **2.2.2.1 What is the programme/project about?**

Located in the Yopno-Uruwa-Som (YUS) region on the Huon peninsula of Papua New Guinea (PNG), the project *YUS Indigenous Forest Reserve* was primarily aimed at creating the first official protected area of PNG, 76,000 ha of land, managed by local communities. Furthermore, the project assessed the impact of climate change on biodiversity in the YUS region, so as to design appropriate adaptive strategies. To this effect, the project team worked in cooperation with Papuan universities and international experts to develop indicators and monitoring systems.

Although initially designed as a biodiversity and climate adaptation project, the YUS reserve generated an array of additional social benefits. It helped in improving structures for



communication between local communities, promoted trusting state-citizen relations in the target region, and improved access to education and healthcare.

The project was funded by the German International Climate Initiative (IKI) and implemented by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) with Conservation International Woodland, and the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) Papua New Guinea from 12/2008 to 12/2013. The project was initiated in 1996 by a consortium of biologists intending to implement a protected area to enhance biodiversity<sup>2</sup>.

#### **2.2.2.2 What is the (potential) conflict context?**

Currently, almost 40 percent of Papua New Guinea's (PNG) population live in poverty and 75 percent of households rely on subsistence agriculture. As most of the people live in rural areas, access to education and employment is limited. With more than 800 languages spoken by over a thousand different tribal groups, PNG is one of the world's most ethnically diverse countries (HRW 2017).

PNG is also listed as 'high warning' country on the fragile country index of the Fund for Peace, mainly due to its uneven economic development and poor public service provisions. The country has also experienced violent conflicts in the recent past. Yet, the project in the YUS region has remained largely unaffected by them (UCDP 2017a). Therefore, work on the *YUS Indigenous Forest Reserve* was not primarily driven by concerns that fragility risks would undermine conservation activities, but rather by the concern that the implementation of a conservation area could create new tensions and conflicts among local landowners.

Indeed, the initial aim of the project was to preserve biodiversity, such as kangaroo species, by expanding the conservation areas in the YUS region. However, a top-down delineation of the conservation area was not possible due to the multitude of local landowners – 90% of land in the YUS region is owned privately by local smallholders. In such a setting tensions and mistrust could easily arise if the conservation area was not delineated in a transparent and equitable manner, and with the goodwill of the population. Yet, it was possible to minimise such risks, albeit not entirely avoid them, by effectively including communities and landowners right from the beginning of the project.

Although not its original intention, the project had a positive effect on social cohesion by bringing together the various stakeholders and increasing communication. The project was successful in building up networks, and creating additional benefits like an education programme and improved healthcare services for local communities.

#### **2.2.2.3 In which way is the conflict context reflected in the programme/project design?**

In order to avoid conflicts between local land-owners, the project aimed to achieve an equal division of land. The project therefore sought to involve all affected stakeholders and included strong participatory elements. Local communities and authorities were all invited to participate equally and early on to participate in the overall project design and implementation. Several visits were paid to communities and local representatives.

Throughout the project, YUS Indigenous Forest Reserve was able to nurture a strong participatory culture. Major activities were organised in cooperation with local communities, allowing the project to evolve organically and respond quickly to changing conditions. The project also included an 'indigenous mapping' workshop in 2005 with community and government representatives to delineate an appropriate area for the reserve. In this workshop

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<sup>2</sup> Among these biologists was Lisa Dabek, Senior Conservation Scientist and Director of the Papua New Guinea Tree Kangaroo Conservation Programme, who served as interview partner and provided information about the project.

locals could voice their concerns and actively take part in land allocation decisions. In the end, the communities unanimously agreed on the final allocation. Thanks also to the early participation of government representatives, this eventually led to the government of Papua New Guinea officially recognising the YUS conservation area in 2009.

The needs assessment phase of the project was also geared towards identifying compensation needs for those affected by land allocation to the reserve. This helped to reduce potential concerns and promote overall acceptance for the project. Moreover, community-based organisations were created to monitor and evaluate the project's implementation and eventually take over the management of the newly created conservation area.

#### **2.2.2.4 What are potential take away messages?**

The project's participative orientation and overall concern for transparency and equity went a long way in avoiding tensions during the project planning and implementation phases. Additionally, the participatory character increased and improved communication between the local communities.

Great care was taken to distribute benefits fairly and pay equal attention to the concerns and demands of different communities. Particular attention was also paid to local norms and traditions. Project facilitators not only respected the culture of indigenous communities, but adopted their customs when communicating with community members.

Moreover, no unrealistic promises were made. Information on intentions were clearly communicated and discussed from the beginning, which helped to avoid misunderstandings and promote trust in the project facilitators. Furthermore, the involvement of government officials (e.g. during workshops) helped to build trust between local communities and government officials.

However, the experience of the *YUS Indigenous Forest Reserve* shows that time is needed to adapt to a culture, to build trust among stakeholders, and to implement effective, participative structures. In the case of the YUS forest reserve facilitators spend almost 20 years building transparent, inclusive and productive working relationships with local communities and state representatives.

### **2.2.3 Philippines: Conflict-sensitive resource and asset management**

#### **2.2.3.1 What is the programme/project about?**

The Conflict Sensitive Resource and Asset Management (COSERAM)<sup>3</sup> Programme supports the integration of poverty reduction and peace-building in the Philippines. Particular emphasis is placed on preventing local conflicts over the use and management of natural resources in the Caraga region (southern island of Mindanao). Land resources are a major asset to Caraga's economy and essential to the livelihoods of local communities. Yet, overlapping claims and conflicting land uses elicit tensions and augment the risk of violent conflicts. Managing these resources in a sustainable and conflict-sensitive way therefore creates benefits both in terms of improving the livelihoods of local people and securing peace.

COSERAM is implemented by GIZ and partner agencies on behalf of the Philippine and German governments. An initial phase from 2011 to 2014 helped enhance processes for the peaceful transformation of resource-related conflicts and resulted in the fabrication of various guides for (local) government representatives, donors, investors and other actors involved in resource

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<sup>3</sup> If not declared otherwise, information for this chapter are extracted from the COSERAM project documentation (Hauschnik 2016; GIZ 2014b; GIZ 2015) and two interviews with former project leader Dr Stephanie Schell-Faucon and current project leader Peter Hauschnik.

management. The programme is now in an up-scaling phase (2016-2018), where good practices and instruments piloted in the first phase are adopted and adjusted by programme partners.

### **2.2.3.2 What is the (potential) conflict context?**

The southern Philippine island of Mindanao, where COSERAM is active, has been the setting for frequent social unrest and armed conflicts. Despite the region's wealth in minerals and other resources (land, water and forests), a large part of the local population and in particular vulnerable groups such as women, young men and indigenous people enjoy only limited access to them, resulting in high levels of poverty and social inequality.

Resource access for these people is stalled by overlapping and conflicting land use claims (i.e. mining and conservation areas vs. ancestral domains of indigenous communities), weak enforcement of regulations, and generally limited possibilities for marginalised groups to legally assert their rights over resources. This situation not only breeds violent conflicts between resource users, but also facilitates the exploitative use of local resources.

A further problem is the weak presence of donors in the region and limited overall capacities to address resource-related grievances and conflicts.

### **2.2.3.3 In which way is the conflict context reflected in the programme/project design?**

To tackle these issues, COSERAM pursues an integrated approach, combining poverty reduction and peace-building via the sustainable and conflict-sensitive management of natural resources. An important part of the programme is geared towards empowering marginalised groups of resource users and more effectively including them in the management of local resources. This involves 1) offering legal support at the lowest administrative level and promoting a gender-responsive, child friendly and conflict-sensitive local justice system 2) providing guidance for government representatives and donors on how to better include indigenous people in planning processes 3) harnessing indigenous systems for sustainable resource use and biodiversity conservation.

Another important component is the promotion of conflict-sensitive land use planning and resource management, including recommendations for addressing overlapping land claims in ancestral domains and criteria for responsible investments in conflict-sensitive natural resources.

A central feature of COSERAM is its sophisticated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system, which collects and evaluates information relevant to the conflict-sensitivity of programme activities. The system tracks changes in the frequency and intensity of violent conflicts in the programme's environment and assesses whether and how these are likely to affect programme objectives and staff security. At the same time the system also evaluates whether these changes are attributable to programme activities. The system is thus essential for both, detecting and avoiding unintended negative consequences (i.e. more conflicts) and measuring programme success (i.e. less conflicts).

A number of analytical tools are deployed within COSERAM's monitoring system in order to cross-evaluate information and get feedback from a wide range of actors. These include quantitative data analysis, expert interviews, an online checklist for team members, as well as a tool to capture the perceptions and needs of programme beneficiaries. Results are regularly discussed to ensure consistent information across all people involved. Moreover, regular team and platform meetings, as well as discussion rounds with partners help reflecting on the limitations of utilised instruments and identify needs for improvement.



#### **2.2.3.4 What are potential take away messages?**

Conflicts over the access to and distribution of essential livelihood resources appear in a variety of contexts, including in situations where resource availability and patterns of resource use are influenced by climatic changes. In this regard, COSERAM offers valuable lessons for the management of both, climate- and conflict-sensitive resources as part of climate adaptation efforts in fragile/conflict areas.

Firstly, there is a price to using sophisticated M&E systems. A combination of methods and multitude of instruments can counterbalance the weaknesses of different instruments and obtain more reliable information. At the same time such a system entails high costs as large amounts of data needs to be gathered, compiled, analysed and disseminated. Programmes might not always dispose of the necessary resources to make such systems work properly. Also, complex systems, which are tailored to the information needs in a specific situation, will not readily be transferable to different situations. If programme activities are up-scaled, they need to be simplified.

Secondly, spaces for reflection and learning are essential in a conflict-sensitive programme, not only to reflect about the conflict-sensitivity of programme actions, but also to reflect about and improve methods and instruments to assess conflict-sensitivity itself. For instance, a special focus on young men was only added later on to COSERAM's monitoring system, after the programme team realised they were a highly relevant group.

Finally, there is a trade-off between maximal participation in planning and decision-making and the need for programme managers to make tough unilateral decisions (e.g. when the safety of staff is at risk). According to our interview partner, more guidance is needed for programme managers in conflict-affected areas to make the appropriate choice when confronted with such trade-offs.

### **2.2.4 Mali: Innovative development planning for climate change adaptation**

#### **2.2.4.1 What is the programme/project about?**

This project is building competencies for climate change adaptation among national and local decision-makers. This enables authorities to identify appropriate, effective measures, and to integrate these measures into decentralised development planning and implementation. The Ministry of Environment and Sanitation (Ministère de l'Environnement et de l'Assainissement) is implementing the project together with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. The duration of this € 3,200,000 project is from 11/2011 until 04/2019 but was stopped in 2012 due to the outbreak of the Mali conflict.

#### **2.2.4.2 What is the (potential) conflict context?**

Development work discontinued in 2012, when the Malian Ministry of Environment and Sanitation was on strike. Since 2016 cooperation has been resumed. However, absent governance structures complicate work and progress of development projects. The project activities started again after armed conflicts ended in the South of Mali. The current implementation process seems to illustrate that national governance structures are not yet built or absent and impede development progress. Apart from the overall conflict context in the country there is a main conflict between foreign development institutions and governmental agencies regarding the use of financial resources. The Malian government continues demanding for financial support without reacting to conditions of capacity building. According to the German partner, this hampers communication, provokes mistrust and generates frustrations among both parties. This conflict is complemented by conflicts for water, land and food at the

local level. Decreasing land area for agriculture and increasing risks of land grabbing intensify these conflicts.

#### **2.2.4.3 In which way is the conflict context reflected in the programme/project design?**

On the national level, capacity building is targeted. Absent or uncertain governance structures impede work and cooperation of international support of development. To solve this blockade, capacity building of governance structure was made a condition for further financial support. Concurrently, international organisations and institutions worked on designing a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) to get access to international funds, and on promoting security of investment.

On the local level, rural development is supported by various projects where further details are needed. The private sector is encouraged to raise investment in climate change adaptation and mitigation by enhancing security of investment or conducting concepts such as “train the trainers” or a platform for sharing experiences.

#### **2.2.4.4 What are potential take away messages?**

Diplomacy is needed: In order to cope with the insecure governance structures, cooperating parties use international support and conditions to promote objectives of adaptation and mitigation. Sensitive topics like financial support were transparently communicated and initiated motivation among the participating parties and progress.

Participatory approaches: Project partners are helping the regional authorities to implement concrete adaptation measures and are additionally lobbying to raise awareness on the need for adaptation measures, identifying financing mechanisms at a decentralised level and developing innovative methods and tools for integrating adaptation measures into decentralised development strategies

Direct responsibility: Project staff avoids activities that contribute to insecure governance structures. By making capacity building a condition of financial support, all parties were encouraged to take responsibility.

### **2.2.5 Colombia: Resource management as entry point for conflict transformation**

#### **2.2.5.1 What is the programme/project about?**

CERCAPAZ<sup>4</sup> (“Peacebuilding by promoting cooperation between government and civil society”) focused on peacebuilding by encouraging cooperation between the state and civil society through dialogue and capacity building. Within the project framework, one out of four components was the project “Capacities for constructive and sustainable management of natural resources and the environment”. This component addressed local conflicts around the use of natural resources by facilitating dialogue and cooperation between resource users, as well as by building capacities for the successful transformation of resource-related conflicts. In doing so, it has provided a number of useful insights into how transparent and inclusive resource management can be used as a vehicle for positive social change.

The programme was carried out between 01/2007 and 03/2015 by the “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zusammenarbeit” (GIZ) and the consortium IP-Consult and Ambero, and was commissioned by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Facilitators worked in cooperation with ministries and stakeholders at the national and regional level in Caldas,

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<sup>4</sup>All information are extracted from CERCAPAZ project documentation (Aguirre et al. 2012) and an interview with the project leader Peter Hauschnik, if not specified otherwise.

Norte de Santander, and Cesar. Regional environmental agencies (regional autonomous corporations) were essential partners throughout the programme.

#### **2.2.5.2 What is the (potential) conflict context?**

Decades of civil war in Colombia have undermined the government's capacity and effectiveness (see UCDP 2017c). Essential services are missing, especially in remote rural areas, including provisions for the effective management of disputes. Moreover, Colombia's legacy of violence and drug-related crimes has eroded trust between communities and impeded a culture of peaceful coexistence. In this volatile context, local conflicts over the use and access to essential natural resources (e.g. water or forest resources) can easily escalate and even lead to overt violence.

Colombia has a legal framework, which theoretically allows for sound and socially responsible resource management, but the implementation of this framework is often hampered by lacking administrative capacities and the failure to include key civil society actors. This makes it more difficult to address conflicts over access to essential natural resources.

In particular, public authorities responsible for the management of natural resources and resource-related conflicts face a number of important challenges, including a lack of coordination between national, regional, and local level administrations, insufficient managerial technical skills and funds (for some agencies), and a heavy burden imposed by decades of civil war. Moreover, authorities are often not aware of local resource conflicts, and when they are, they are often reluctant to assume responsibility for their resolution. Difficulties in addressing present and past resource conflicts, in turn, undermine the credibility of resource management institutions, thus further impeding their ability to address such conflicts in the future.

These challenges are compounded by a lack of civil society participation in resource management more generally, and in the management of resource-related conflicts more specifically. People are often not aware of the responsibilities of local and regional resource management administrations, and thus cannot effectively interact with these administrations when resource conflicts arise. A problem further complicated by a lack of communication and often also a lack of trust between communities. Moreover, social organisations representing the interests of resource users often lack the capacities to influence relevant policies in a meaningful way.

Finally, there is also room for improvement with regard to the involvement of the private sector in sustainable and conflict-sensitive resource management.

#### **2.2.5.3 In which way is the conflict context reflected in the programme/project design?**

In response to these challenges, CERCAPAZ and more specifically its socio-environmental component sought to facilitate the successful transformation of resource-related conflicts in the Colombian regions Caldas, Norte de Santander, and Cesar. The component supported dialogue and cooperation between local resource users, as well as with responsible authorities, while also strongly emphasising the improvement of societal and institutional capacities for the conflict-sensitive management of natural resources.

The component included trainings and advice to key actors of the public sector: trainings in methods of conflict transformation at lower and intermediate administrative levels - i.e. municipalities and regions - and awareness-raising on socio-environmental conflicts (on their underlying causes and their impacts) among programme partners at higher administrative levels - i.e. regional and national environmental authorities. Because the latter often see conflict resolution as an 'unnecessary addition' to their responsibilities, it was crucial to convince them of the importance of addressing resource-related conflicts. Moreover, officials were sensitised as

to the necessity of transparency and broad civil society participation to ensure the long-term success of resource planning. As an important result of these efforts, sectoral policies (e.g. water or biodiversity policies) are now “developed in a participatory manner and have a social objective, which did not happen this way before” (Aguire et al. 2012:22).

Moreover, the component included both, trainings for companies and for civil society representatives. Participants learned about the responsibilities of relevant political authorities (e.g. regional environmental authorities) and about possibilities to better cooperate with them on resource management issues. Companies were made aware of their responsibilities in terms of human rights (including the right to a healthy environment) and given appropriate instruments to minimise the socio-environmental impacts of their operations. These activities have facilitated and encouraged the participation of non-state actors in resource management, thereby contributing to a more open and productive relationship between public authorities, civil society, and the private sector.

As a further objective, the component also aimed at improving existing communication processes to encourage constructive dialogue between resource users and with relevant authorities, avoid the duplication of efforts, and share positive and negative experiences. Peer to peer knowledge dissemination between shareholders was facilitated by the formation of practice and learning communities in programme regions. These communities now play an active part in reproducing methodologies for the peaceful resolution of resource-related conflicts.

#### **2.2.5.4 What are potential take away messages?**

CERCAPAZ's socio-environmental component offers an illustrative example of how resource management can contribute to conflict transformation. Socio-environmental conflicts arise from disagreements, but also from misunderstandings and from uncertainty regarding the (future) use and distribution of natural resources. In Colombia, these conflicts are often exacerbated by a lack of cooperation and communication between involved people and responsible authorities. As shown here, resource management offers several possibilities to tackle these problems: It can reduce negative externalities, such as resource degradation, and thereby ease tensions between resource users. It also offers a framework in which possible solutions (e.g. compensation measures) can be discussed constructively. Moreover, communication between stakeholders as part of resource management processes can help addressing uncertainties, clarifying misunderstandings, and eventually building trust.

Transparency and participation are essential for achieving the above objectives. Broad participation of public, private, and civil society actors makes them jointly responsible for the success of resource management and conflict transformation processes. Thus, it increases the commitment of civil society actors to help responsible authorities and provide them with necessary information. At the same time, transparent processes make public authorities more accountable and thus encourage them to increase their conflict resolution efforts. Participatory processes imply a high short-term investment in the structures necessary to coordinate the actions of a wide range of actors. However, their long-term benefits in terms of more successful interventions and lasting change are likely to exceed these costs.

Capacity building is crucial for enabling transparent and inclusive conflict transformation processes. Trainings raise awareness for conflictive issues and convey helpful tools for jointly addressing them as public, private, and civil society actors. Yet, to ensure a broad and lasting effect beyond isolated interventions, transmitted knowledge and skills need to be assimilated, refined and further disseminated within the national context. This includes both, a horizontal dissemination of learnings to places outside of programme areas, as well as a vertical

incorporation of lessons learned into national level policies. Only under these conditions can a coherent framework for the management of resource-related conflicts be achieved.

This latter step is particularly challenging, as revealed by the experience of CERCAPAZ: In spite of great efforts to include top administrative levels, capacity building efforts would only reach the intermediate technical level in most cases. A main recommendation from the programme is thus “to work even harder with counterpart institutions, so that the generation of change and institutional development transcends all levels of the organisation, not just the technical intermediate levels” (Aguire et al. 2012:21).

## **2.2.6 Peru: Complementarity of climate change adaptation and conflict transformation**

### **2.2.6.1 What is the programme/project about?**

“Adaptation to climate change and disaster risk reduction in Ica and Huancavelica, Peru” (ACCIH: Adaptación al cambio climático y reducción del riesgo de desastres en cuencas priorizadas de Ica y Huancavelica)<sup>5</sup> was an integrated project for climate adaptation and water management in southern Peru. It aimed at reducing the negative impacts of climate change on agriculture and pastoralism in the Peruvian regions Ica and Huancavelica, both part of the catchment areas of the rivers Ica and Pisco. As part of the project, climate-vulnerable communities were provided with training, technical assistance and small infrastructures to augment their resilience vis-à-vis extreme temperatures and variations in rainfall, which had become more frequent in the project area. ACCIH further encouraged cooperation between upstream and downstream water users in the Ica and Pisco catchment areas to ensure the coherence and viability of local adaption measures.

The project was implemented between 2011 and 2016 by GIZ on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and in collaboration with the Centro Nacional de Estimación, Prevención y Reducción del Riesgo de Desastres (CENEPRED) - Peru's inter-ministerial agency for early warning and disaster risk reduction.

### **2.2.6.2 What is the (potential) conflict context?**

ACCIH was implemented against the backdrop of severe tensions between water users in Ica and Huancavelica, which had already led to violent incidents in the past.

Ica, which is located downstream from Huancavelica, has experienced rapid economic growth over the last decades. With major help from the Peruvian government and international donors the region has been able to develop a dynamic export-oriented agricultural sector. This has been facilitated above all by the construction of major dams and canals in the Andes, which store and divert water from upstream regions. Given the rapid expansion of agricultural production in Ica, the region's dependence on upstream water resources has constantly augmented over the years.

Huancavelica is located upstream in the Peruvian Andes and has been largely left out by market liberalisation and export-driven economic development. Communities in Huancavelica struggle with high unemployment, low education levels, and generally limited access to services, due in parts to the negligence of national development planners. Grievances borne out of this situation are further exacerbated by the fact that Huancavelicans have little say in the development of their region's water resources<sup>6</sup> and that existing water infrastructures mostly serve the interests

<sup>5</sup> If not declared otherwise, all information are extracted from an interview with the project leader Claus Kruse, as well as from Kruse et al 2016.

<sup>6</sup> Major water development projects in the region have been commissioned by the national institute for development of Peru (INADE: Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo) since 1990. In 2003, supervision of these projects has been transferred to the regional government of Ica.



of agricultural producers in Ica. Besides their negative impacts on local communities and the environment, these infrastructures are also emblematic of Huancavelica's marginal status in comparison to its much wealthier downstream neighbour.

Historically, water resources have thus been a bone of contention between the two regions and disputes over the management and further development of water resources have at times led to protests, threats, and even violent acts of sabotage.

That said, fully understanding the conflict between water users in Ica and Huancavelica goes beyond mere economic and technical considerations. Tensions between up- and downstream communities are also driven by misconceptions, mistrust, and chauvinism. Political actors in Ica have often downplayed the concerns of their upstream neighbours, while being alarmist about water security in their own region. Moreover, part of the Ican discourse, including statements made by high level representatives, has been marked by derogatory remarks and even threats against upstream communities. Those, in turn, have been entrenched in a discourse of victimisation and accusations against downstream water users, often alimented by misconceptions about the actual implications of past water development projects. While it is true that these have had some negative social and environmental impacts, popular claims that they would be mainly responsible for the economic hardship of Huancavelican communities are clearly exaggerated and ignore other important factors (i.e. the marginal role Huancavelica has played more generally in national development policies).

These views are not shared by the majority of people in Ica and Huancavelica. Yet they have had a disproportional weight in public discussions and hindered an open dialogue between up- and downstream water users.

### **2.2.6.3 In which way is the conflict context reflected in the programme/project design?**

From the outset of the ACCIH project in 2011 persisting tensions between up- and downstream water users were identified as major obstacles to effective resource management and hence climate adaptation in the Ica and Pisco catchment areas. In particular since a recent law in Peru obliges regions in the same river basin to jointly manage their water resources via basin councils expressly created for this purpose. Concretely, this meant that some of the necessary measures to counter increasingly erratic rainfall and more severe floods were contingent on the regional governments of Ica and Huancavelica reaching an agreement on the further development of their water infrastructures. Given the history of conflict between the two regions, such an agreement was highly uncertain.

To ease cooperation between up- and downstream water users ACCIH initiated a series of meetings, roundtables, and other events that brought together stakeholders from Ica and Huancavelica. These offered spaces for exchanging technical information and ideas, but also for overcoming prejudices and negative stereotypes. Furthermore, they allowed more moderate and reconciliatory views on both sides to be communicated.

An important part of the project consisted in organising trainings for water users and administrative officials in view of acquiring a diploma in resource management and conflict transformation. These included technical elements that conveyed important skills for climate adaptation and the effective use of water resources, but they were also geared towards raising awareness about the benefits of cooperation and the institutional opportunities for joint water management. Furthermore, participants were trained in techniques of conflict transformation and encouraged to take an active role as mediators in their respective communities. The Universidad Nacional San Luis Gonzaga de Ica was a major partner throughout this part of the project.

Moreover, the project placed a particular emphasis on the most vulnerable communities in Huancavelica, supporting them in becoming more resilient vis-à-vis increasingly erratic temperatures and rainfalls, but also in view of taking greater part in decision making regarding the further development of local water infrastructures. Thus, it attempted to partly remedy the large asymmetry between up- and downstream water users – one, if not the central driver of conflict in the region.

These activities facilitated a positive shift in the relations between up- and downstream water users. In March 2014, Ica and Huancavelica agreed on a roadmap in view of creating a basin council for the joint management of water resources in the Tambo-Santiago-Ica catchment area. Yet, this process was interrupted just two weeks later, following a statement by the Peruvian president, in which he announced ambitious plans to divert further water from upstream regions toward Ica. These plans included provisions to build infrastructures, which various interest groups in Huancavelica vehemently opposed.

To address resulting tensions, Peru's national body for conflict resolution, the ONDS (Oficina Nacional de Diálogo y Sostenibilidad) had to step in, which, in turn made it necessary to adjust ACCIH activities: the ACCIH project started to assist the ONDS and supply it with important background information about the conflict between Ica and Huancavelica. Moreover, it helped with the organisation of workshops and talks with the main conflict parties, leading to the creation of a bi-regional discussion table over the management of water resources in August 2015. Moreover, a bi-regional technical commission was created in October 2015 to resume cooperation in view of creating a basin council for the Ica-Santiago-Tambo catchment area. Provisions to strengthen the role of the regional government of Huancavelica were elaborated and particular attention was given to the needs and rights of Huancavelican water users.

These efforts could not entirely resolve the conflict, but provided the basis for a renewed agreement over the creation of a joint basin council in August 2016: an important step in direction of more effective water cooperation between Ica and Huancavelica.

#### **2.2.6.4 What are potential take away messages?**

The above conflict and its partial resolution offer a number of important lessons for conflict-sensitive climate adaptation. They show that conflicts over the distribution and management of natural resources like water can be a major obstacle to effective adaptation. But, at the same time, climate adaption provides opportunities for addressing and transforming existing conflicts – i.e. by showing conflict parties the importance and potential benefits of cooperation in the face of climate change and associated hazards.

However, it should be clear that such cooperation requires time and open spaces for dialogue between conflict parties. Mistrust and negative prejudices, which are often deeply seated, need to be addressed and gradually replaced with better information and positive experiences. Trainings provide opportunities to do this, as they offer spaces for the exchange of ideas and the promotion of cooperation, while also encouraging broad participation by offering clear benefits in terms of new skills and capacities to withstand climatic change.

Moreover, dialogue between conflict parties needs to be coherent with, and supported by policies at higher levels. As seen in this example, interventions by higher level authorities, in this case the national government can be counterproductive, if not in line with processes at lower levels. Early communication and coordination of programme activities across institutional levels is thus essential.

## 2.3 Key criteria for the design of a guide on conflict-sensitive adaptation

### 2.3.1 Conflict-sensitive approaches: Conflict prevention or peacebuilding as specific objectives

**Hypothesis 1:** Conflict-sensitive approaches can add value to adaptation projects if the different target dimensions of conflict prevention or peacebuilding are clearly stated.

The starting point of a conflict-sensitive programme approach is the insight that political measures per se are not conflict neutral. Every project is inevitably part of a political dynamic and has not intended consequences. These may be positive or negative. A project can unintentionally contribute to aggravating already existing conflicts and / or trigger a conflict.

A climate adaptation measure involving the redistribution of resources may – if it is essentially targeted at a specific social group – lead to distribution issues and concerns over equality. The measure can reinforce already existing conflicts, which is particularly relevant in the context of fragile statehood and already conflictual situations. However, it may also positively influence the course of the conflict. A climate protection measure, which indirectly leads to the creation of alternative income opportunities can, for example, have socially or economically stabilising effects, thus helping to defuse a conflict.

A conflict-sensitive programme approach attempts to anticipate these negative and positive dynamics in advance and adapts and designs the programme accordingly. Two approaches can be distinguished: (a) **conflict-preventing approaches** and (b) **peacebuilding approaches**. Both approaches differ in their objectives:

- a) A **conflict-preventing approach** seeks to avoid potential unintended negative effects of environmental and climate programmes, to not aggravate conflicts or outbreaks of violence (“do-no-harm” principle).
- b) A **peacebuilding approach** seeks to contribute to the overcoming and / or reduction of the root causes of conflict. Essentially, this approach aims to demonstrate that environment and climate policy can also function as peace policy.

Previous experience on climate adaptation approaches in conflict-affected contexts suggests that a targeted use of conflict-sensitive approaches has either not been carried out yet, or solely indirectly and selectively.

### 2.3.2 Essential instruments for a conflict-sensitive approach

**Hypothesis 2:** In order to design conflict-sensitive climate programmes it is necessary to make use of different instruments. These should lead to a comprehensive understanding of the conflict situation, the interactions of a project and its context.

In order to make climate and environmental programmes conflict-sensitive, a number of analytical tools are available that address different aspects of programme implementation.

**Conflict analysis** (*Peace and Conflict Assessment*) or **integrated scenario analysis** (*Conflict Analysis + Vulnerability Assessment*):

Conflict analysis essentially attempts to identify the political, economic and socio-economic starting situation. In this way, the causes of conflicts, underlying actor constellations and related dynamics are recorded.

An integrated scenario analysis goes one step further. It seeks to identify potential conflicts that could arise from trends such as climate change. It combines a conflict analysis with a



vulnerability analysis. A vulnerability analysis aims to estimate the impact of climate change on states and / or groups. At the centre of an integrated analysis is the designation of future possible conflict processes (development of best case / worst case scenarios) under changing environmental conditions.

**Impact Assessment:** An Impact Assessment seeks to clarify to what extent a project is conflict-preventive / peace-promoting or even conflict-aggravating. It is typically done after the conflict analysis. The impact analysis offers the possibility to check the planned project for its conflict-relevant consequences and to adapt accordingly.

**Impact Monitoring (*Monitoring & Evaluation*):** The central goal is a continuous review of the conflict context and the interaction between the project and the conflict context and a corresponding adaptation of the project. It is carried out after the start of the project.

So far, no comprehensive findings on conflict sensitive climate projects exist. However, against the background of practical experience and the variable objectives of climate projects, it seems relevant to develop a handout in the form of a variable toolbox rather than a single guide. The tools should be selected according to the purpose and context. When using the instruments, a process-oriented procedure is useful.

### 2.3.3 Key elements of a successfully implemented conflict-sensitive project

**Hypothesis 3:** Case studies suggest that conflict-sensitive approaches can be successful if they are context-specific, participative, long-term, and flexible.

A variable range of instruments and the integration of essential elements of project planning contribute to a successful implementation of a conflict-sensitive project. Practical examples as well as insights from peace and conflict studies show that projects are particularly successful if they are context-specific - that is, if they are geared to local requirements and local needs – and if they are designed to be participatory, long-term and flexible.

**Context-specific:** At the programme and project level, measures should be considered which do not overwhelm local actors and institutional frameworks. Projects should aim to take human capacities and institutional capacities into account and, where possible, strengthen them (*capacity building*). Special local (including cultural) conditions and needs should also be addressed by continuously involving local actors in the planning and implementation.

**Participatory:** Through the involvement of local (conflict) actors and stakeholders, a common understanding can be developed with regards to conflict analysis and the planning and implementation of the project. A participatory process not only increases the legitimacy of the project, it can also act as a means of conflict-prevention. However, this should not translate into the application of a Western understanding of participation. The specific form of participation must be explored in cooperation with the employees and local groups involved in the implementation process.

**Long-term goals and flexible implementation:** setting a long-term, strategic goal creates an understanding for local values, norms and cultural interaction patterns. It allows the project to be flexibly adapted to the local challenges and needs on the ground, enables confidence building and open space for discussion. A flexible design gives the opportunity to respond to the changing conditions on site.

The three elements require project specific specification. In addition, the involvement of the local level should be subject to the approval of the partner governments.

**Practical example: Papa New Guinea**

An IKI project focusing on biodiversity has sought to establish a long-term dialogue with numerous smallholder farmers in marginalised communities. In this way, a common agreement was to be found in order to designate protected areas for a threatened species. By fulfilling local needs, the project was supposed to contribute to social cohesion.

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
### 3 Challenges and limitations for integrating conflict sensitivity in fragile contexts

#### 3.1 Strategies for engagement in fragile contexts: The role of international actors

##### 3.1.1 Introduction


After decades of decline, the past years have seen a slight upsurge in armed conflicts. While inter-state war remains rare, non-state violence and civil wars have risen substantially since 2010, as illustrated by the figure below.

**Figure 1: Number of conflicts worldwide**



Source: World Bank 2018:2

This increase is a surge but not yet a trend (Dupuy, Rustad 2018). Much of this violence is related to what is often termed “fragile states”, “fragility” or “fragile contexts”. Fragile states are essentially highly unstable countries that struggle to provide core governance services to meet citizens’ needs and expectation. They are typically characterised by a number of economic, social, political problems. They include, amongst other, latent conflict and violence, sustained poverty, high levels of inequality, weak state capacity and bad governance, interventions of external actors and proneness to exogenous developments and events (e.g. spikes in tariffs, oil and food prices, extreme weather events). These problems are often interlinked and re-inforce each other in a vicious circle. A certain interplay between these factors might lead to a “tipping point”, and thus to state collapse, large-scale violence, even war. In its latest report, the Global Fund for Peace lists 33 fragile states. Most of these states are to be found in Central Africa and in the Middle East, as the map below shows (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Fragile State Index 2018**

Source: Global Fund for Peace 2018

State fragility has not only severe impacts on the security and well-being of populations but also on other neighbouring countries and regions. Some argue that it provides the breeding ground for terrorism, drives large-scale migration, enables the flourishing of human trafficking and piracy (Auswärtiges Amt 2017; LSE-Oxford Commission 2018:3). Because of these broader and transboundary impacts, addressing state fragility has become a key priority for the international development, security and foreign policy community over the last decade. In 2007, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), recognising that fragile states deserve special attention and a new, coordinated approach, developed the “Principles for International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations”. In 2011, the OECD developed this approach further and together with the g7+ countries, a voluntary group of countries facing conflict and fragility, agreed on a “New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States”. Through this landmark agreement, development partners committed to supporting nationally-owned and -led development plans and greater aid effectiveness and the g7+ countries committed to more inclusive and context-sensitive planning processes (PBSB Dialogue 2018).

Several initiatives and actors are currently taking stock of the lessons of the past and seek to develop proposals to address shortcomings. Despite some progress over the last decade, the results of this international fragile states agenda are rather disappointing. A recent study by the LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development concludes that the international efforts to make fragile states safer and more prosperous have largely failed (LSE-Oxford Commission 2018). While there are many reasons for this, in the view of the Commission the bad performance is largely attributable to the lack of distinctive approaches. It argues that international actors do not properly account for the specific situations and needs of fragile countries. Too often, measures adopted in fragile states continue to be dominated by the agendas and preferences of donors, partly even exacerbating the fragile situation on the ground (LSE-Oxford Commission 2018:32). The report recommends that international actors – such as donor countries, aid agencies, international finance institutions, the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – need to engage in further reflections and adapt their

approach to local realities on the ground. In May 2018 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reviewed its own activities in fragile states and published a critical evaluation (IMF 2018). The evaluation finds that despite an overall positive assessment, the IMF's overall approach has fallen short of what could have been achieved. It notes that the IMF's efforts have “not been sufficiently bold or adequately been sustained” (ibid: viii). Fragile states, the report concludes, require special attention and the IMF to increase its impact through a distinctive approach that takes the local situation better into account.

This policy paper seeks to contribute to such critical reflections on the policy level. It does with a specific focus on the policy field of climate change adaptation. The key question this paper seeks to address is: What should international actors in the field of climate change adaptation (e.g. international donors, implementing agencies, NGOs) consider when planning and implementing climate change adaptation programmes?

The paper is structured in three parts: Chapter two provides some background information on fragile states, describing what is commonly understood under ‘fragile states’ and highlighting the various causes and characteristics of fragility. Chapter three addresses the core question. It seeks to scrutinise how international actors in the field of climate change adaptation can feasibly do to take account of the risks that arise out of fragility. It comes up with four policy recommendations. Chapter four provides a summarising conclusion.

### 3.1.2 Understanding fragility

#### 3.1.2.1 What is fragility?

Just as fragile states and the reasons that cause fragility are very diverse, so too are the definitions that attempt to describe them. The OECD, the World Bank and the Global Fund for Peace, for instance, employ different definitions and metrics to account for fragility. As over the last years the term ‘fragile states’ has been stigmatised as being too pejorative and analytically imprecise, as it focuses too much on formal state institutions to explain fragility (Mcloughlin 2016:3). In recognition of these shortcomings of the term ‘fragile states’, policy actors are increasingly using the term ‘fragility’ or ‘fragile situations’. The idea here is to better capture the fact that fragility is not exclusively determined by the nature and boundaries of the state but also by horizontal society-society relations or vertical municipal/local dynamics which have an impact on the state-level (OECD 2018:24).

Whilst there is no common internationally-agreed definition of the term “fragile states” or “fragility”, in practice, there are still some general commonalities that unite various definitions. One could argue that a “fragile state” or “fragility” commonly refers to a country that is at high risk of failing along three dimensions (Steward, Brown 2010; Gravinghold et al. 2012):

- ▶ **authority:** the country struggles to protect its citizens from violence
- ▶ **capacity:** the country struggles to provide its citizens with access to basic services (such as water, health, education and implement basic policy)
- ▶ **legitimacy:** the country enjoys limited support among the population

As highlighted above, what counts as a fragile state and what not depends, however, largely on the precise definition of the term and the metrics to measure it. In practice, “state fragility is not an ‘either/or’ condition, but varies along a continuum of performance, as well across state function and capacity” (Mcloughlin 2016:8). A growing body of research has demonstrated that

there exists a wide spectrum of different stages of fragility, ranging from semi-manageable contexts and protracted political crises, to chaos and anarchy where people seek their own form of problem solving in absence of a formal state with all possible intended and unintended effects (Draude, Börzel and Risse 2018).

### 3.1.2.2 Causes of fragility

According to the scientific literature there are many reasons why states are fragile<sup>7</sup>. Many of them are contested and not clear-cut. Fragility is commonly understood as a complex and multi-causal phenomenon. Often highlighted causes of fragility are:

**Table 1: Overview causes of fragility**

Causes of fragility	Example
Structural and economic factors	Poverty, low income and economic decline, violent conflict, presence of armed insurgents, natural resource wealth/lack of natural resource wealth, geography, demographic stress
Political and institutional factors	Crises of state legitimacy and authority, bad governance, repression of political competition, weak (formal) institutions, hybrid political orders, institutional multiplicity, political transitions, succession and reform crises in authoritarian states, state predation, neo-patrimonial states
Social factors	Horizontal inequalities, severe identity fragmentation, social exclusion, gender inequality, lack of social cohesion (including lack of social capital), weak civil society
International factors	Legacy of colonialism, international political economy, climate change, global economic shocks (including food prices)

Source: Mcloughlin 2016:11

This list of factors is by no means exhaustive. Moreover, it is crucial to note that in the scientific literature these causes are often described as being interlinked and mutually reinforcing each other. The reasons for fragility cannot be ascribed to a single factor but rather to a combination of factors.

A more recent branch of research highlights, for instance, in particular the interplay between climate change, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, state fragility and conflict (AfDB 2003; Barnett, Adger 2007; Grist, Brown 2009; Corenda et al. 2012; Rüttinger et al. 2015, USAID 2015). The argument that runs through this line of research is that fragile states are particularly vulnerable to adverse effects of changing climatic conditions because they lack the necessary capacities to mitigate and address them. Where governments and institutions are unable to manage or absorb the stress of changing climatic conditions and related weather extremes (e.g. droughts and floods), the risks to the stability and societies increase (see, for instance, Rüttinger et al. 2015). Climate change, in combination with other social, economic and environmental trends (e.g. demographic pressure, increased resource demand, inequality) may then aggravate already fragile situations, contribute to trigger social upheavals, even violence.

<sup>7</sup> For an excellent summary see Mcloughlin, C. with I. Idris. 2016.



### 3.1.2.3 Characteristics of fragility

Although fragile contexts are unique in terms of the causes that lead to fragility, what unites them is that they are characterised by a **conflictual, politically highly volatile environment** in which the **governance capacities are typically constrained** by a range of factors at the individual, organisational and institutional level such as<sup>8</sup>:

- ▶ **Resources (who has what)**
- ▶ **Skills and knowledge (who knows what)**
- ▶ **Organisational Capacities (who can manage what)**
- ▶ **Politics and power (who can get what)**
- ▶ **Incentives (who wants to do what).**

These characteristics represent not only a challenge for local authorities but also for international actors who want to support fragile states. For instance, a politically highly volatile environment makes planning and the implementation of programmes extremely difficult. Their limited capacity also limits the possibility to absorb new programmes. If poorly designed, a programme sponsored by international actors might overwhelm state capacities, deepen societal divisions and, in doing so, trigger tensions, even conflict.

### 3.1.3 Addressing fragility

How can international actors in the field of climate change adaptation account for these challenges? What interventions are appropriate?

#### 3.1.3.1 Adopt a conflict-sensitive approach

##### Recommendation 1: Take the local context seriously

##### **Define targets in terms of**

- **Politics and power (who can get what)**
- **Incentives (who wants to do what)**

##### **Take the local context seriously**

Adaptation strategies, programmes and projects should be designed in a way that they (a) do not create or exacerbate conflicts and (b), ideally, contribute to peace. In short, they should be 'conflict-sensitive'. A 'conflict-sensitive programme' is a programme that is grounded in the fragile, conflict-ridden reality on the ground. It takes the context seriously and pays attention to political dynamics and underpinning power relations. All programme activities are designed and periodically reviewed in a way that do not inadvertently create or exacerbate conflict and, ideally, address the underlying causes of fragility.

To do so, international actors should base the **adaptation programme on a conflict analysis and, thus, on a comprehensive understanding of the fragile situation on the ground.** A

<sup>8</sup> The following points have been adopted from Brinkerhoff 2010:67



conflict analysis seeks to uncover the profile, causes, actors and dynamics characterising the conflictual, volatile environment. Table 2 illustrates key questions of such a conflict analysis.


**Table 2: Key questions for a conflict analysis**

Topic	Question to address
Conflict profile	What is the political, economic, socio-cultural context?
Conflict causes	What are the structural sources of the conflict?
Conflict actors	Who are the main actors?
Conflict dynamics	What are the current conflict trends?

### Monitor, evaluate and revise the programme

Next to a conflict analysis, international actors should closely monitor and evaluate the impact of the programme on the fragile context throughout the implementation phase. They should carefully assess any changes on the ground via the systematic collection of information. Once a volatile situation on the ground is changing for the worse, they should revise the programme accordingly. Figure 3 illustrates this reflexive approach:

**Figure 3: Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity**



Source: adelphi

### 3.1.3.2 Reduce complexity and improve skill development

#### Recommendation 2: Reduce complexity and improve skill development

##### Define targets in terms of

- Available resources (who has what)
- Available skills and knowledge (who knows what)

**Consider a “best fit” solution**

Reduce complexity: Instead of setting up an ambitious comprehensive programme/project that requires substantial technology, resources and capacity training to function international actors should consider to set-up a rather limited adaptation programme/project. In a highly volatile environment where an actor can easily undermine efforts, transformative “first-best” solutions (from a strictly economic perspective) may not necessarily be implementable (World Bank 2017:64). Accordingly, international actors should consider a “best-fit” solution; a solution that is more limited in its scope but that works within the conditions and abilities on the ground (Corenda et al. 2012:35; LSE-Oxford Commission 2018:33). With regard to adaptation that means to consider programmes that scale up knowledge and competencies that are already there and, thus, require relatively few resources and capacities.

An example could be to concentrate more on *ecosystem-based* (EbA) and *community-based* (CbA) approaches – adaptation programmes that capitalise on existing natural resources and ecosystems and traditional local knowledge to take action on climate change. EbA use biodiversity and ecosystems for adaptation. Coastal mangroves, for instance, can provide protection against cyclone damage and storms, wetlands can act as floodwater reservoirs and well-vegetated hillsides can help to reduce risks from erosion, landslides and downstream flooding when rain comes in heavy bursts. CbA capitalises on the wealth of knowledge and experience that communities have on dealing with climate variability. It empowers local communities and is strongly based on participatory planning and implementation methods. A growing body of evidence supports EbA as successful approach to climate change adaptation that can be cost-effective and provide substantial social, environmental and economic co-benefits (see, for instance, GIZ 2018, USAID 2017, Reid 2016, Munroe et al. 2011). There is also some evidence demonstrating the value of CbA approaches in the context of climate change adaptation (Vardakoulis, Nicholles 2015; CARE 2014). Since EbA and CbA have proven increasingly valuable in the context of climate change adaptation it could make sense to employ such approaches more strongly in fragile contexts.

**Focus technical assistance on advice and skill-development**

International actors should consider complementing adaptation programmes with more limited, but focused and locally-driven capacity building measures. The case for more limited capacity measures derives from the, at best, mixed experiences with comprehensive capacity building programmes. So far, the development community has largely focused on designing “first-best” solutions and then transferring the *functional* expertise needed to implement programmes through *comprehensive* capacity-building measures (e.g. trainings, workshops) based on capacity needs assessments. The guiding idea has been to turn local staff into technical experts. While capacity-building measures – that is transferring skills, competences and knowledge – is surely important to allow for programme effectiveness, it has turned out it is not enough to allow for a sustainable change on the long run. Experiences with capacity building indicate that the expected long-term effect to transform people or organisations is usually not achieved (UNEP 2012:34). The investment in statistical capacity in Africa, for instance, has not led to an implementation of evidence-based politics based on socio-economic monitoring data because elites fear data systems as tools the opposition could use to audit their performance (World Bank 2017:12).

The problem with such approaches is the tendency of international actors to view capacity-building as a purely functional, a-political process (World Bank 2017:11). The approach tends to

ignore the power politics on the ground: Some actors might have little incentives to apply acquired skills, competence and knowledge and thus hinder effective change. This might also be some (institutional) structures or incentives that impede change. The way forward is to take better account of these contextual power dynamics throughout the programme design and capacity building process (UNDP 2015; World Bank 2017). It means investing more time in identifying leaders (“political champions”) and institutions that drive effective change and providing more support to facilitate an enabling environment for (institutional) change. That implies to increase engagement with middle and lower level staff in organisation and to include “change management” support: inspire staff to participate in the design in new structures, processes and services. That is “to take ownership for their services, internalise change and elevate expectations, and motivate incrementally improved performance” (UNDP 2012:35). Including change management means to go beyond skill and competence training and to address broader questions of leadership and participation. Recognise that the staff has relevant experiences and ideas to share and provide spaces for knowledge sharing and upscaling (UNDP 2012:10). Overall such a “locally-owned capacity development” (Rosén, Haldrup 2013:3) focuses more on “delivering advice and support with knowledge management, coaching through feedback and performance management and on-the-job skills development” (UNDP 2012:35) than on classic technical backstopping. International actors act more in a facilitating than in a leading role.

### 3.1.3.3 Work with alternative governance actors

#### **Recommendation 3: Engage with alternative authorities and use flexible governance approaches**

##### **Define targets in terms of**

- **Organisation (who can manage what)**

##### **Do not shy away from engaging with subnational level and informal non-state actors**

International actors should consider interacting with a broader set of partners, including actors in the more informal sector at the subnational level (Vernon, Baksh D. 2010; Cooke, Downie 2015). International actors, especially international organisations, typically work directly with (or act with support of) governments to implement a policy. This is understandable as the global governance system is still largely state-based. In this state-centric logic governments are the only legitimate partner in international relations. As member state organisations international organisations (such as UN agencies) are even directly bound to support governments via their mandate. The fragile context poses, however, a number of challenges for international actors. In fragile contexts the state, by definition, lacks the authority, capacity and legitimacy to implement policies. There might be areas where the state is simply not present; which are under control of non-state actors (e.g. communities, rebels). People in these areas cannot be reached by international organisations without interacting with non-state actors. How, then, can international actors support people in need? How can the adaptive capacities of those people be enhanced when there is no (legitimate) state? From a human security perspective leaving those communities behind cannot be an answer.

International actors should work with local realities on the ground and, thus, also cooperate with “alternative authorities” to support people and enhance their adaptive capacity. Who are these alternative authorities in fragile contexts? The answer depends on the specific situation on the ground. Every fragile context is different. Cities and local authorities might be such actors, but also non-state actors such as tribal communities, NGOs or professional associations like trade unions. Usually, subnational-level authorities enjoy higher levels of trust and, thus,

legitimacy. In some cases they can represent the concerns and insights of specific and particular vulnerable groups (Corenda 2012:32) and might be better equipped to monitor and implement adaptation policies on the ground and/or flag problems and the need to adapt approaches where necessary (Vivekananda 2011). There is, of course, a trade-off with suggested de-centralisation or transnationalisation. It can backfire, and re-inforce conflict lines. At worst, working with alternative authorities can further destabilise the state and contribute to its collapse. For de-centralisation to work, it is advisable to have an agreement in which the central government has some limited role (e.g. supervisory or accountability role). Moreover, adaptation measures which touch core delivery services of a state might be too sensible for governments (e.g. infrastructure) and, as such, should not be delivered without government consent (see also LSE-Oxford Commission 2018:67).

### **Use a flexible governance approach: Networked governance**

A key problem to realise such a more flexible approach is that international actors are, so far, typically not organised to work with city-level, community or (informal) non-state actors. Their modus operandi is mostly built on state institutions (Schettler et al. 2018:29). This limits the scope for engagement. Dealing with fragile contexts requires therefore innovations in governance. To work in fragile contexts, contexts which are constituted by various competing authorities, formal and informal ones, and turbulent dynamics requires a more informal “networked governance” approach for international organisations. A networked governance approach can be understood as a more “loose form governance” as opposed to a formal and bureaucratic form of governance. Networked governance involves a number of actors and is pluri-centric. In terms of decision-making, governance networks are based on a negotiation rationality. Compliance is enabled through the negotiation of key goals and principles and ensured through contracts. In practice, it means the provision of governance services through actors other than the state – that is, non-state actors. International actors act merely as “facilitator” in this governance network (USAID 2014); based on their convening power – the ability to bring actors together – they facilitate an exchange on goals and priorities and use a “light touch” in activities to steer direction but they minimise their own presence in this network.

### **Question your own conventional organisational practices**

Acting differently comes with risks and, ultimately, it is unclear if they outweigh the benefits. The flipside of networked governance is that this way of governing may contribute to further increase the fragmentation of power in fragile contexts. It might negatively impact state legitimacy and capacity and thus re-inforce fragility. The right way is therefore to work with both, formal and informal institutions. It is about finding a way how non-state actors can support the development of state capacities for direct provision on the long-term. Doubtless, this is a tremendous political challenge. Also, if properly done, international agencies would need to give up some of their own rigid programme and project structures such as business cases or deliverable quantifiable outputs (Chattopadhyay 2016); also the staff must understand itself rather as communicator or relationship-builder than as service deliverer. It is questionable if larger, and, in particular, if public organisations will take on their own bureaucracy and internal structures. In any case, fragile contexts call these practices and structures into question. Given the limited success in dealing with fragile states over last years, new approaches are needed.

**3.1.3.4 Have a clear goal, be patient and invest in your staff****Recommendation 4: Focus on the outcome and be flexible****Define targets in terms of**

- **Organisation (who can manage what)**

**Have a clear goal but be flexible in implementation**

International actors should have a clear goal, but be flexible in implementation. Protracted and sudden violent crises pose tremendous security-related and operational risks. Against this backdrop, the question arises if it makes at all sense in the first place to implement an adaptation programme in such dynamic and risky contexts. From a human security perspective no adaptation is, however, no option. Over the long run, no action is likely to make things worse given that climate change is one of the drivers of fragility. Experience from the humanitarian field indicates that in such uncertain situations a clear goal, the sequencing or limitation of activities and flexible operational procedures (instead of overtly technocratic procedures) are successful (UNDP 2012).

The sequencing of activities must, however, be clear-eyed regarding the gravity of the violence. In conflict-ridden contexts an exit-strategy should be developed in advance, and if necessary consequently put into action. For more dynamic crisis situations the UNDP programme SURGE provides useful tools and procedures to fast-track support and facilitate the provision of resources and benefits. In any case, the time-frames for activities in conflict-ridden contexts must be realistic given the highly uncertain and long-term nature of transformative processes. The more severe the situation, the more time it will require to conduct activities.

**Give up wishful thinking: building institutions takes time**

International actors should be realistic and patient. By definition, fragile states are countries that do not have capable institutions. Conflict adaptation programmes should take these limited capacities into account, and give priority to strengthening institutions and human capacities. The problem is that building institutions is a challenging and long-term process. It requires time, patience and constant reinforcement, especially in a fragile context. To transfer capacities in a sustainable way requires a long-term engagement. Yet, a lot of donor-funded programmes/projects remain short-term orientated (LSE-Oxford Commission 2018) and, accordingly, rather focused on transferring knowledge and functional skills necessary to implement a certain policy. Donors often want immediate and visible results. This is understandable, given that they need to justify expenses vis-à-vis their constituencies. There is, however, no quick fix to fragile states. In the end, donors need to strike a better balance between short-term activities and long-term investment (UNDP 2012:26); they need to be more realistic and question the short-term nature of project cycles. To achieve real progress requires investing more time (and money).

**Invest in your staff**

Along with the investment in time, comes the investment in own staff. As highlighted above, key for a programme to be successful is to have a solid understanding of the fragile situation on the ground, including its root causes and fuelling actors, and flexibility in terms of the execution of the programme once the situation changes. To realise such a conflict-sensitive approach requires competent and experienced staff. Only staff that has been working for long enough in fragile country contexts knows the local situation and dynamics and is able to make good and informed decisions about what works and what does not. Some international actors such as the

IMF seem to suffer from a high staff turnover in fragile contexts and experience difficulties in attracting seasoned staff (IMF 2018:33). If this is a more widespread problem, international actors need to make working in fragile contexts more attractive (e.g. by providing financial incentives and /or link assignments in fragile states with attractive future assignments).

### 3.1.4 Conclusion

Over the last years domestic conflicts and civil wars, largely due to fragile states, have increased. Fragile states and how to best deal with them has become a key priority for the international community. Fragile states can be understood as states with limited authority, capacity and legitimacy to implement policies. Climate change and the related increase in extreme weather events and environmental degradation, has the potential to overstretch existing few adaptive capacities of fragile states and could possibly lead to climate-induced resource scarcity and thus livelihood insecurity, direct resource competition, tensions, destabilisation and violence. In other words, climate change might affect the security and stability of states and thus be the ‘tipping point’ that turns fragile states into failed states. Also, climate change adaptation measures themselves, if poorly designed, have the potential to overwhelm these states and trigger a spiral of violence. Hedging these potential unintended consequences is crucial.

So what should international actors in the field of climate change adaptation (e.g. international donors, implementing agencies, NGOs) consider when planning and implementing climate change adaptation programmes? This paper outlined four suggestions:

1. **International actors should adopt a conflict-sensitive approach.** A conflict-sensitive approach takes the local context seriously by paying particular attention to local dynamics. This means, international actors should conduct a conflict analysis before planning and implementing programmes and closely monitor the situation on the ground throughout the implementation phase. The programme should be revised once the volatile situation changes for the worse.
2. **International actors should reduce the complexity of programmes and improve skill development.** They should consider more limited adaptation programmes; programmes which are better in accordance with the conditions and abilities on the ground. A possibility could be to focus more on ecosystem and community-based approaches to adaptation. Moreover, required assistance should favour focused and locally-driven capacity building measures over complex and comprehensive strategies.
3. **International actors should work with alternative governance actors.** In fragile contexts, governments exert, by definition, only limited authority. International actors should therefore, when necessary, also work with alternative authorities to leave no one behind and consider a more loose and flexible form of governance. Such a “networked governance” approach requires, however, a shift in own organisational practices. In a networked governance approach international actors would merely act as “facilitator” drawing on their convening power. They would steer direction but minimise their own presence in this network.
4. **International actors should have a clear long-term goal, be flexible and invest in their staff.** International actors should be realistic and patient: Fragile contexts pose tremendous challenges and operational risks. International actors must better accommodate these fragile situations by engaging more long-term and adopting more flexible procedures to achieve the goals. This requires more investments in their own administrative staff.



## 3.2 Successfully implementing conflict-sensitive adaptation: Experiences and lessons learned

### 3.2.1 Introduction

Natural disasters hit people hardest in fragile and conflict-affected states. Fragile and conflict-affected states typically have lower capacities to address natural hazards and their consequences and therefore depend on international assistance. International assistance is important to 'leave no one behind'. The predicted increase in extreme weather events due to climate change increases human suffering and thus the demand for risk reduction measures and climate change adaptation measures. Simultaneously, existing state fragility is hampering adaptation efforts. Adaptation measures, if poorly designed and implemented, might overwhelm local capacities and exacerbate tensions or even trigger them. How can climate change adaptation measures be effectively enacted in contexts with limited capacities and where peace and stability is not the standard? Very little exists conceptually and programmatically how to design and implement adaptation measures in such fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Existing approaches are usually not tailored to local circumstances. One promising solution is to embrace "conflict-sensitive" adaptation measures. But successfully implementing "conflict-sensitive" adaptation measures requires a shift in the mind-set and operative practices of international actors.

This paper outlines such an approach and illuminates what is needed to successfully implementing conflict-sensitive adaptation measures. Based on "lessons learned" coming from a limited number of case studies on adaptation programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts and more general insights from the peace and development sector, this paper identifies some principles that should be embraced by international actors to successfully implement conflict sensitive adaptation programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Given the limited evidence base, the paper's findings must, however, be treated with caution. The main purpose of the paper is to stimulate a discussion what "good practice" *may* look like and to trigger further in-depth research. Establishing "good practice" recommendations requires a more robust evidence base on good and bad experiences. Accordingly, the paper finishes with a call to collate what is known and what is not known. Generating and sharing evidence is crucial to adequately support adaptation in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

### 3.2.2 Setting the stage: Why conflict-sensitive adaptation?

#### **Disaster, fragility, conflict and violence are mutually reinforcing**

States and societies are increasingly under pressure by a multitude of shocks and stressors. This includes, for example, resource constraints and political unrest. As research indicates, climate change is a "threat multiplier" that is likely to further increase instability (Rüttinger et al. 2015). There is little doubt that it will worsen already fragile situations, making it harder to promote peace, adaptation and sustainable development. Crisis-affected countries are amongst the most vulnerable to climate change. Evidence demonstrates that natural disasters hit people hardest in fragile and conflict-affected states. Between 2004 and 2014 58 % of deaths from disasters occurred in countries that are among the top 30 most fragile states (Carnwarth 2017). This is not an accident. Fragility, conflict and violence and natural disasters are mutually reinforcing.

On the one hand, fragility, conflict and violence can exacerbate the impact of natural disasters. The reason is that there is nothing natural in natural disasters (Toro 2011). The only thing "natural" about these types of events is the hazard itself: a storm, floods, tsunami etc. If a disaster materialises depends on political issues such as, for instance, the level of disaster preparedness (e.g. measures taken to prepare or reduce the effects of natural events), the actual



disaster response (e.g. measures taken to contain or mitigate immediate effects), governance capacities, enforcement of rules (such as building codes) or available resources, amongst other. For instance, if state capacities and structures are weak (e.g. because of lack of funds and human resources, infrastructure and basic services states), states are less able to respond. This increases the likelihood that hazard will become a natural disaster. Also, poverty, inequality, lack of rule enforcement, conflict and violence exacerbate the impact of natural disasters. They might offer an incentive or even force people to move to risk-prone areas, exposing them to natural hazards. Governments involved in domestic conflicts might also use the disaster to their benefit by utilising post-disaster aid and assistance for their own ends, thereby exacerbating post-disaster human suffering (Mitra, Vivekananda 2015).

On the other hand, natural disasters can also be drivers of fragility, violence and conflict. Extreme weather events can exacerbate the challenges people and states already face and thus the fault-lines of a conflict (Peters 2017:19; Schleussner et al. 2016). They create additional stress and may overstretch governance abilities and capacities. The lack of an inadequate response can fuel grievance, increase or create new vulnerabilities as people are forced to use their savings, drive anger and put public legitimacy and authority under pressure. Disasters may also erode livelihoods; they may affect the availability, access and distribution of natural and other resources. The destruction and environmental erosion, in turn, might induce displacement, economic distress, migration, triggering or intensifying competition over increasingly scarce resources and facilitate tensions, violence and conflict.

#### **Climate change will increase fragility risks**

To tackle the destabilising effects of climate change in fragile contexts comprehensive and cross-sectoral responses are required (Rüttinger et al. 2015). The need for action is not only underlined by the expected increase in extreme weather events and environmental degradation related to climate change, but also by the high number of people living in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. According to the World Bank, in 2017 around two billion people live in countries that are affected by fragility, conflict and violence. The share of extreme poor living in conflict-affected situations is expected to rise from 17% of the global total today to almost 50% by 2030 (World Bank 2018:1). Recognition of the interrelationship between climate change and fragility has led the international community to reflect on whether the international practices are fit for addressing these challenges (Rüttinger et al. 2015). While the need for integrated approaches has been highlighted conceptual and programmatic development is still under way.

#### **Adaptation in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is challenging: The case for conflict-sensitive adaptation**

The challenge is that adaptation measures need to be grounded in the political reality of fragile states: Given limited resources and capacities, protracted crises and violence can be challenging for fragile states to fully engage and implement adaptation activities. Adaptation activities might overwhelm country capacities and thus not smooth but unintentionally exacerbate fragility. At worst, adaptation activities themselves might trigger conflict. Unavoidably, adaptation activities have an impact on local power dynamics. They distribute benefits and resources. This distribution affects people's lives, livelihoods and asset-base. How resources are distributed may lead to increased tensions, distorted incentives, and negative perceptions of staff that may undermine the programme. Adaptation activities require therefore careful attention to the dynamics and drivers underpinning fragility, violence and conflict.

One answer is to set up a "conflict-sensitive adaptation" programme. It means grounding a programme in this fragile, conflict-ridden reality – that is, paying particular attention to the fragile, conflict-ridden context. In a conflict-sensitive adaptation programme all programme activities are designed and periodically reviewed in a way that that, at minimum, do not

inadvertently create or exacerbate conflict. Ideally, programme activities are designed in a way that they address the underlying causes of fragility (Scherer, Tänzler, forthcoming).

Conflict-sensitive adaptation programmes are based on a conflict analysis and thus on a comprehensive understanding of the fragile situation on the ground. Throughout implementation the fragile context and impact of the programme on the fragile context are closely monitored. Once the volatile situation on the ground is changing, the programme is adapted accordingly. Conflict-sensitive approaches have their origin in the humanitarian and peace-building sector (Haider 2014).

It is important to note, however, that conflict-sensitivity should not be seen as a tool to programming but as an approach to policy-making (World Vision 2017:18). It is an approach that seeks to transform the behaviour of international actors operating in fragile or conflict-affected contexts. Conflict-sensitivity demands a shift in the mind-set and operative practices of international actors and its decision-making staff.

### **3.2.3 Critical reflections: Guiding ideas for successfully implementing conflict-sensitive adaptation**

#### **Take the local context seriously – with all its challenges and limitations**

The mind-set that is required to successfully implementing conflict-sensitive adaptation is *to take the local context seriously*; that means first of all, taking the local context with *all its challenges and limitations* seriously. That implies also to question conventional operative practices.

So what are challenges and limitations that need to be taken seriously? By definition, fragile context are fragmented spaces, characterised by what some label “limited statehood”<sup>9</sup>. In fragile contexts, state authority and capacity is highly limited. The underpinning drivers are manifold, multi-dimensional and often mutually reinforcing (McCloughlin C. with Idris. I. 2016). Drivers include conflict, protracted political crises (e.g. frequent coup d’état), corruption, understaffing, highly limited financial resources, high staff turn-over, poor cross-sectoral and departmental coordination. In many fragile contexts, public authorities do not have the political will or simply the necessary institutional means to implement policies. In other words, *effective* public governance is highly limited.

Limited governance does not mean that there is no governance; that is, that there exists an anarchic, chaotic situation. Quite in contrast, in fragile contexts, various (non-state) actors, sometimes external actors provide (locally legitimate) governance. It “just” implies that *effective public governance is limited* to some geographic areas or sectors. Fragile contexts are therefore highly dynamic political environments. Economic decline, rising inequality, a foreign intervention might challenge the governing capacity and thus the legitimacy of governing (non-state) actors. In a fragile situation, it does not need much and the situation might turn upside down. Fragile states suffer, by definition, from absorptive capacity constraints. The constraints can result in programmes being counterproductive, even harmful. For instance, the implementation of a burdensome, externally-financed adaptation programme might simply bind too much administrative staff and, in doing so, lead to underperformances in other policy fields. In short, it might overwhelm state capacities. The inability to meet expectations might further undermine the legitimacy of the state, stimulate political tensions, even violence.

Taking the local context with *all its challenges and limitations* seriously means to be aware of varying local conditions and capacities; it means to be able to navigate through these politically

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<sup>9</sup> See the research group around the SFB 700 « Governance in areas of limited statehood ». The SFB 700 is a collaborative research centre funded by the German Research Foundation. <http://www.sfb-governance.de/en>

highly volatile environments. This is difficult and a tremendous challenge for external actors. International actors need not only a thorough understanding of the situation on the ground, but they also be capable of quickly adjusting their programmes and projects to prevent harm and secure the effectiveness of their intervention. These conditions require programme staff to have a strong and detailed knowledge of local conditions, needs and (conflict) dynamics in the areas where the programme operates; they require excellent communication and decentralised decision-making structures, so that programme manager can react quickly to conflictual developments (Peters 2017:34-35).

But even with knowledgeable individuals and institutionalised structures, a programme will not be successful unless local actors and communities are continuously and effectively involved in the programme. A scoping study covering a limited number of environment adaptation projects<sup>10</sup> and more general “lessons learned” coming from development agencies working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts indicates that the success of conflict sensitive approach depends substantially on the promotion of local ownership, open and transparent communication, and a flexible, open-ended programme design.

### **Promote local ownership: empower local actors to participate in the design of programme**

What does the promotion of local ownership and capacity mean in practice? Although the importance of promoting local ownership has been recognised in numerous reports as a *sine qua non* for building resilience, development and peace (see, for instance, UN 2015; SDG Fund 2017), there is no common understanding what promoting “local ownership” actually means and how this principle can be effectively translated into actual programming. “Local” can refer to various levels (national, sub-national and community level); what is local depends very much on project design. “Ownership” is typically used to describe the ability of (local) actors to lead or participate in programme activities (See exemplarily Schirch, Mancini-Griffoli 2015). The difference between leading and participating is, however, not a small one.

The more useful perspective to look at local ownership is from an organisational sociology perspective. True local ownership can be understood as a “bottom-up approach” to programme design and implementation. Usually programme activities in fragile or conflict-affected contexts are specified in advance by “Northern” donors and programme designers, sometimes with little in-depth knowledge about the situation in question” (Rosén, Haldrup 2013:6). A bottom-up approach, by contrast, recognises that local actors have valuable knowledge, skills and capabilities. These should be the starting point of any effort to assist them and develop a programme.

From this maximalist perspective “promoting local ownership” means *to empower local actors to participate in the design of programme, its structure and services*. It means to break-up the state-centric nature of conventional approaches by developing and strengthening programming through forging close partnerships with local actors. The result is a more organic, country-led or “home-grown” programme; a programme that has been designed with substantial input from and implemented in close collaboration with partners. Such a “home-grown” programme is likely to be more relevant to the local context. It is equipped with more “input legitimacy”.

### **Maximise impartiality, allow for feedback and be accountable**

To empower local actors to participate in programme design and implementation is easier said than done in a fragile and conflict-affected context. Identifying “adequate” partners is a challenge

<sup>10</sup> Adelphi analysed five adaptation projects in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The analyses captured the context of the programme and its implementation. The reports are largely based on interviews with programme officers. The projects were geographically spread and addressed different issues. Given the limited number and diversity in projects it may not wise to draw comprehensive conclusions.

(See Conflict Consortium 2012:19). There exist no interest-free actors, all actors have agendas. Potential partners are likely to have certain biases or political affiliations. Involvement in a programme or project lends legitimacy to the partner. When identifying and selecting a partner it is therefore crucial to maximise impartiality. Experience from the field indicates that for projects at local level, community groups and trusted and respected elders were identified as key connectors in many contexts<sup>11</sup>. This does not mean that community groups and trusted, respected elders are ‘unproblematic’ actors. Quite in contrast: They are respected by some and not by others. It is also important to capture deviant voices via discrete ways. Maximising impartiality helps to reduce the potential of tensions arising out of the programme or project.

Once this is done a structured feedback channel helps to ensure a positive implementation of the programme. A structured feedback mechanism allows not only to identifying unintended effects of programme implementation, it also increases trust. It is crucial, however, that the feedback rounds are designed in a way to allow for safe spaces. Key is to enable open, critical discussions, where all views are justified. Also, trust is not created *ad hoc*. Trust is built up only over time and is enabled through transparent communication. This implies also to manage expectations.

#### **Papa New Guinea: The YUS Indigenous Forest Reserve**

Evidence for the success of such a locally-led and long-term adaptation project is the *YUS Indigenous Forest Reserve* project. The Yopno-Uruwa-Som (YUS) region on the Huon peninsula of Papua New Guinea (PNG), contains some of the world’s last great expanses of mature tropical rainforest with a unique assemblage species that have evolved in this biodiversity hotspot. Over the years destruction of the rainforest by mining, logging, and development threatened the continued existence of the ecosystem. The project *YUS Indigenous Forest Reserve* was primarily aimed at creating the first official protected area of PNG to preserve biodiversity and save the tree kangaroo from extinction. A national, top-down delineation of the conservation area was neither desirable nor possible due to the multitude of local landowners – 90% of land in the YUS region is owned privately by local smallholders. The project therefore involved local authorities and indigenous communities to participate in the overall project design and implementation process. Intensive and extensive consultations were conducted, allowing the project to evolve organically. Major activities included an “indigenous mapping” workshop with community and government representatives to delineate an area for the reserve. In this workshop local, small landowner could voice their concerns and actively take part in land allocation decisions. In the end, the communities reached a consensus and unanimously agreed to allocate land. Thanks also due to the early participation of government representatives the government of Papua New Guinea officially recognised the YUS conservation area in 2009. Although this was not its original intention, the project had a positive effect on social cohesion by bringing together the various stakeholders and increasing communication.

#### **Adopt a supportive and facilitative, not an instructing role: embrace a flexible, open-ended programme design**

Participation in the development context is usually externally induced, enabled or incentivised, that is, by donors. In programmes that promote local ownership more radically, international actors act merely as “facilitator” than “instructor”: they coordinate programme activities and seek to create enabling conditions for programme success. They use a “light touch” in programme activities or initiate a process (e.g. by bringing people together, provide training

<sup>11</sup> This insight is based on the YUS Indigenous Forest project described in the grew case study box. Yet, also the general review of World Vision’s conflict-sensitive projects reports the same experience (see World Vision. 2017. Conflict Sensitivity: Metra-trend analysis. Available at <http://www.wvi.org/peacebuilding-and-conflict-sensitivity/publication/conflict-sensitivity-meta-trends-analysis>)

opportunities, providing advice) and focus on creating change without direct intervention (USAID 2016). International actors exercise a more subtle form of power.

Facilitating “real” local ownership requires a long-term engagement and the willingness to give up default design. Giving up default design and acting as facilitator may not be appropriate for every context. It can, however, be useful for activities in complex environments where outcomes are not always predictable (USAID 2016). External actors may not be able to fully grasp the circumstances and dynamics on the ground until engaged. Limited evidence from the development sector indicates that such a facilitating role and thus a “learning-by-doing” approach could be particularly suitable for fragile contexts.

It is important to note that embracing flexibility requires not only time but also flexibility towards anticipated timeframes for results to be achieved. It requires time to understand the context, develop goals and strategies, to set priorities and identify the right partners. It requires reflection over the sequencing of activities. The value of time “to let things develop” cannot be underscored enough (UNDP 2012). A more flexible approach requires, of course, changes in the way progress is monitored. Against this background it must also be acknowledged that in fragile and conflict-affected contexts progress does not happen in a linear way. In fact, a programme might also face numerous and severe setbacks in a volatile political environment. There is little choice but to accept these risks until more is known what can be achieved and what not (Peters 2017:31).

#### **South Sudan: The IGAD Initiative**

An example for a flexible, open-ended and long-term programme is provided by UNDP’s capacity development support programme within South Sudan’s state-building process. The IGAD Initiative (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), sometimes also known as the Regional Capacity Enhancement Initiative (RCEI) is a regional capacity development cooperation programme for South Sudan. The goal of RCEI was to train administrative staff to exert core governance functions. The programme falls not within the policy field of adaptation and, yet, it provides valuable lessons that can be transferred. In fact, the initiative is frequently highlighted as a prime example that accommodates frequent recommendations for engagement in fragile states namely south-south cooperation, ownership, addressing local needs and priorities, and developing local capacities, bottom-up approaches, long-term engagement, flexibility, context and nimbleness (see UNDP 2012; Rosen 2013). The most interesting aspect of the programme is that it emerged “more by default than by design” (Rosén, Haldrup. 2013:2). The IGAD initiative was not a result of detailed project design and tightly managed implementation from the top down. Goals, priorities and needs were often not pre-specified or part of a detailed implementation plan. Instead, they developed out of an extensive and intensive consultation process and thus out of an explorative assessment. Subsequent capacity training activities grew out of the unspecified project objectives (Rosén, Haldrup. 2013). In sum, it appears it was the vague project design that created the space needed to ensure the greatest impact and sustainability of capacities developed.

### **3.2.4 Conclusion and next steps**

#### **Key recommendations**

States and societies are increasingly under pressure by a multitude of shocks and stressors, including population growth, resource constraints and political unrest. Research points out that climate change is a “threat multiplier” that is likely to increase instability. On the one hand, fragility, conflict and violence can exacerbate the impact of natural disasters. If state capacities and structures are weak, states are less able to respond. This increases the likelihood that a hazard will become a natural disaster. On the other hand, natural disasters can also be drivers of



fragility, violence and conflict. Environmental degradation, increasing climate variability, slow-onset events (such as sea level rise) and extreme weather events can exacerbate the challenges people and states already face and thus the fault-lines of a conflict. Climate change is likely to exacerbate these effects.

To tackle the destabilising effects of climate change in fragile and conflict-affected contexts comprehensive and cross-sectoral responses are required. And yet, given limited resources and capacities, protracted crises and violence, it can be challenging for fragile states to fully engage and implement adaptation activities. Complex adaptation activities might overwhelm country capacities and thus not smooth but unintentionally exacerbate fragility. At worst, adaptation activities themselves might trigger conflict.

One answer is to set up a “conflict-sensitive adaptation” programme. It means grounding a programme in this fragile, conflict-ridden reality– paying particular attention to the fragile, conflict-ridden context. In a conflict-sensitive adaptation programme all programme activities are designed and periodically reviewed in a way that, at minimum, do not inadvertently create or exacerbate conflict. Ideally, programme activities are designed in a way that they address the underlying causes of fragility.

Preliminary experience from adaptation and development programmes in fragile contexts indicate that the success of conflict sensitive approaches depends substantially on the promotion of local ownership, open and transparent communication and a flexible, open-ended programme design. That means, when implementing conflict sensitive adaptation programmes, international actors should:

- ▶ Empower local actors to participate in the design of adaptation programmes
- ▶ Establish open and transparent communication channel
- ▶ Adopt a facilitative and not instructive role

Advancing these recommendations requires that international actors give up their rigid programme structures (such as deliverable quantifiable outputs), have a greater tolerance towards failure and commit themselves long-term. Committing long-term requires, of course, also greater input of resources, including finance. Also, international staff on the ground has to understand itself rather as communicator or relationship-builder than as service deliverer. In short: the recommendations require that international actors give up their conventional organisational practices. This will be a challenge in particular for hierarchical and multilateral organisations such as ministries or UN bodies. In any case, fragile contexts call these practices and structures into question. Given the limited success in dealing with fragile states over the last years, there is little choice but to try a different way.

#### **Next steps: Collate what is known**

In any case it is important to not miss out the opportunity for learning what works and what does not. To advance knowledge and making progress around conflict sensitive adaptation it is of utmost importance to create a more robust knowledge base. It requires a solid body of knowledge that documents which adaptation projects worked and which did not, and above all why. Only once this knowledge base has been established more conclusive recommendation can be developed.

To facilitate knowledge generation, governments should motivate experienced and knowledge resource persons working in fragile and conflict-ridden contexts on climate or disaster-related programme to share their experiences on international platforms, fora and workshops. This allows the development of a community of practice that shares, debates and learns from each



other how to advance adaptation projects in fragile and conflict-affected states. Given the experiences in the humanitarian and peacebuilding sector it would be extremely valuable to include also peace- and state-builders in this dialogue. A cross-sectoral response requires breaking-up administrative silo-thinking. Only then insights can be leveraged and synergies can be realised.

### 3.3 Climate change in the Security Council: fragile countries perspectives

#### 3.3.1 Introduction

Climate change may affect especially people in fragile and conflict-affected states. Fragile states have typically lower capacities to address natural hazards and, therefore, depend on international assistance which is a key to 'leave no one behind'. In addition, a sound understanding on how climate change is affecting peace and stability within the states themselves is needed to ensure and enable early action. Clear insights on the negative repercussions of climate change such as reduced access to water or food or an increase in disaster risks should be an alarming and urgently needed signal for the international community to act.

In this context, the UN Security Council (SC) can play a significant role. Not only in framing issues in terms of importance and urgency but also to initiate coordinated response measures within the international community and especially among UN bodies. The main responsibility for tackling climate change remains with the key international convention, the United Framework Convention on Climate Change. However, other UN bodies, international partners as well as national entities of the respective states need to take action to consider climate change within their own activities, include measure to strengthen resilience and support timely processes regarding climate change adaptation.

Chapter 3.3 analyses to what extent the Security Council can currently be considered as a forum for climate security and reflects on its potential role for meaningful action towards climate security in the future. The beginning of 2018 can serve as an example that climate change is already a meaningful factor in some of the discussions on the situation in Somalia as well as around the Lake Chad:

- ▶ As part of the “Statement by the President of the Security Council” as of 30 January 2018 the intersection of climate change and stability across West Africa and the Sahel is highlighted:
  - *“The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors.”* and
  - *“The Security Council recognizes the efforts of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and welcomes the holding of a first regional stabilization conference in the Lake Chad Basin region, as well as the regional initiative spearheaded by President Buhari of Nigeria to revitalize the ecosystem of the Lake Chad Basin to support sustainable livelihoods, security as well as development in the region.”*
- ▶ When the Security Council end of March 2018 extended the Assistance Mission in Somalia until 31 March 2019, the unanimously adopted Resolution 2408 (2018) stressed as important factor “[...] the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity”.

There is already some profound analysis available that describes in more detail the main elements of past debates in the Security Council in the last ten years - be it in terms of drivers behind the debate (such as Small Island States), be it in terms of potential response pathways. What is missing and should be analysed here is to what extent the affected fragile states themselves have also been actively engaged in this debate in the SC and, if so, what position they took and what response measures by the SC and its partners they have been supporting. The answers are important for different reasons. First, if fragile states or some of them are actively supporting a SC dealing with climate change as a security threat, this can be an important partner in any future debate on the issue in the SC. Germany as new incoming non-permanent member of the SC in 2019/2020 already indicated its ambition to make climate change and security a topic of its chairmanship. In the past, Small Island States representatives have been outspoken within and outside the SC on the topic. Fragile states could play a similar role. This is also because the SC should move beyond being mainly an agenda setter for the climate change and security topic. It should also be able to formulate or initiate meaningful action. To this end an active role of fragile states in this regard can be helpful and offer entry points for concrete initiatives.

### **3.3.2 Setting the stage: Why climate change as a topic for the Security Council?**

#### **Climate change as a “threat multiplier” – especially in fragile contexts**

Some states and societies are increasingly under pressure by a multitude of shocks and stressors, including population growth, resource constraints and political unrest. Research has repeatedly pointed out time that climate change is a “threat multiplier” that is likely to increase instability but that preventive action to strengthen resilience can help to avoid such risks (Tänzler et al. 2013; Rüttinger et al. 2015). Increasing resource pressure will very likely worsen already fragile situations, making it harder to promote peace, adaptation and sustainable development. Crisis-affected countries are amongst the most vulnerable to climate change. Evidence demonstrates that natural disasters hit people hardest in fragile and conflict-affected states. Between 2004 and 2014, 58 % of deaths from disasters occurred in countries that are among the top 30 most fragile states. This is mainly due to the fact that fragility, conflict and violence and natural disasters are mutually reinforcing (Rüttinger et al. 2015).

There are two crucial interrelations of fragility, conflict, violence and climate change. On the one hand, fragility, conflict and violence exacerbate the impact of natural disasters. How far a disaster materializes depends on issues such as disaster planning, governance capacities and available resources. If state capacities and structures are weak (e.g. because of lack of funds and human resources, infrastructure and basic services), states are less able to respond. This increases the likelihood that a hazard will become a natural disaster. Also, poverty, inequality, lack of rule enforcement, conflict and violence exacerbate the impact of natural disasters. On the other hand, extreme weather events and natural disasters can also be drivers of fragility, violence and conflict. Extreme weather events can exacerbate the challenges people and states already face and thus the fault-lines of a conflict (Peters 2017, 19). They create additional stress and may overstretch governance abilities and capacities. The lack of an inadequate response can fuel grievance, increase or create new vulnerabilities as people are forced to use their savings or do not have any fall-back at all, drive anger and put public legitimacy and authority under pressure. Disasters may also erode livelihoods; they may affect the availability, access and distribution of natural resources. The destruction and environmental erosion, in turn, might induce displacement and migration, triggering or intensifying competition over increasingly scarce resources and facilitate tensions, violence and conflict.

To tackle the destabilizing effects of climate change in fragile contexts comprehensive and cross-sectoral responses are required (Rüttinger et al. 2015). The need for action is underlined not

only by the expected increase of extreme weather events and environmental degradation related to climate change, but also by the high number of people living in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. According to the World Bank, around two billion people now live in countries that are affected by fragility, conflict and violence. The share of extreme poor living in conflict-affected situations is expected to rise from 17% of the global total today to almost 50% by 2030 (World Bank 2017). This critical situation of fragile states deserves to make it a specific topic of the climate security debate – and this also applies when the debate enters the SC.

### **The Security Council as a forum to discuss climate change**

Recognition of the interrelationship between climate change and fragility has led the international community to reflect on whether the international practices are fit for addressing these challenges, most recently also as part of the G7 foreign ministers' discussion (Rüttinger et al. 2015). While the need for integrated approaches has been highlighted, a concrete conceptual and programmatic development is still under way.

The history of climate change as a topic of the SC is now more than ten years old (see Conca et al. 2017, Tänzler 2018). The UK as SC president initiated a first discussion on climate and security in April 2007. Although 55 member states were attracted by the discussion there was no official outcome. A number of governments stressed in their remarks the (in)appropriateness of discussing the issue in the Council. Framing by other countries included potential consequences of climate change for peace and security – among them border disputes, instabilities around migration, scarcity of resources such as energy, food and water. In addition, the significant impacts on already weak states were underlined.

Pacific island states then took the issue to the General Assembly and achieved a compromise: Resolution 63/281 invited relevant organs of the United Nations to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications. In addition, the resolution asked the Secretary-General to report on security implications and collect member states views to this end. This report published by the Secretary-General in 2009 was meaningful for incorporating a wide range of views and expanding the debate also by emphasising the role of how mitigation and adaptation can help to prevent climate-induced conflicts.

In 2011, Germany brought the issue back to the SC, with a record participation of 64 member states. Representatives from China, India, and Russia stated major scepticism towards the Council as a forum to discuss climate change. As one reason they strongly argued to deal with related challenges in fora such as UNFCCC. However, the debate concluded with a presidential statement that not only stressed that climate change is a security threat but that the Secretary-General and UN organs should provide contextual information on how respective changes will affect countries undergoing a peacebuilding process.

After this Council debate, climate change has been discussed on different occasions in the SC as already outlined in the introduction. These discussions have not led to more meaningful outcomes such as a resolution and there is still no international legal provision to account for the disappearance of Small Island States as a result of climate change. Nor is there any progress in recognising the existence of so-called climate- or environmentally-induced migrants. However, it is worth noting that during the open SC debate in 2015, China acknowledged the non-traditional security threats island states are facing. In addition, the SC unanimously adopted Resolution 2349 in 2017, which hinted that climate change had contributed to conflict and instability around Lake Chad and the wider Sahel region. And in January 2018, a second presidential statement twice referenced climate change in the context of instability in the Sahel region.

**UNSC actions on climate- or environment-related security issues since 2007**

Date	Subject	Type of Meeting	Initiator(s)
Apr 2007	Energy, Security	Open Debate	UK
June 2007	Natural Resources and Conflict	Open Debate	Belgium
July 2011	Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Impact of Climate Change	Open Debate	Germany
Feb 2013	Security Dimensions of Climate Change	Arria Formula	UK/Pakistan
June 2013	Conflict Prevention and Natural Resources	Open Debate	UK
June 2015	Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier	Arria Formula	Spain/Malaysia
July 2015	Peace and Security Challenges Facing Small Island Developing States	Arria Formula	New Zealand
Nov 2015	Illicit Arms Transfers and Poaching in Africa	Arria Formula	Angola/Lithuania
April 2016	Water, Peace and Security	Arria Formula	Senegal
May 2016	The Sahel: Impact of Climate Change and Desertification	Briefing	Spain/Egypt
Nov 2016	Water, Peace and Security	Open Debate	Senegal
June 2017	Preventive Diplomacy and Transboundary Waters	Briefing	Bolivia
Dec 2017	Climate Change	Arria Formula	France, Italy, Japan, Sweden the UK, the Netherlands and Peru, Germany, the Maldives and Morocco
Dec 2017	Addressing Complex Contemporary Challenges to International Peace and Security	Open Debate	Japan
July 2018	Climate Related Security Risks	Open Debate	Sweden
Oct 2018	The Role of Natural Resources as a Root Cause of Conflict	Briefing	Bolivia
Oct 2018	Water, Peace and Security	Arria Formula	Bolivia, Ivory Coast, the Netherlands Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Indonesia and Italy
Nov 2018	Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict	Arria Formula	Kuwait
Jan 2019	The Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security	Open Debate	Dominican Republic

Source: Climate Security Expert Network 2019

## Main climate change narratives in the Security Council

Existing analysis of the topic climate change in the SC illustrates that there are a number of key issues (see also Conca et al 2017; Schaik et al. 2018). When comparing potential entry points for the SC (see Conca et al. 2017 based on a literature review and interviews with UN representatives), the researchers identified six proposals. They are incorporating climate risks into peacekeeping operations, developing an early-warning system, managing the threat to small-island states, engaging in preventive diplomacy, addressing climate refugees, and embracing a climate-related analogy to the norm of a responsibility to protect. Especially the first five of the six can be observed when analysing the different debates of the SC related to climate change and security:

### ► Addressing the threat to Small Island States

Climate change as a threat to the national sovereignty and as a matter of survival has been one major storyline of Security Council discussions related to climate change. Not only Small Island States but also governments (e.g. Germany) referred to the close relationship between cause and effect – at least compared to other conflict situations, which are significantly shaped by a complex web of influencing factors.

### ► Addressing climate-induced migrants

Closely related to the question of disappearing land, the issue of climate-induced migrants has been referred to as one of the major security-related impacts of climate change. In the open SC debate of 2015, this framing was even used by China when referring to the non-traditional security threats Small Island States are facing. However, there is substantial reluctance by many governments to refer to environmental and climate refugees as they fear major consequences for international humanitarian law and the Geneva Convention, which does not include environmental or climate change as legitimate causes to seek asylum.

### ► Incorporating climate into current peacebuilding operations

The critical situation of fragile states regarding to peacebuilding operations has been one topic that obviously relates to the mandate of the SC. States or regions already considered as conflict prone or currently undergoing a process of post-conflict rehabilitation are in a situation of fragility when they try to (re) establish the rule of law or enable economic and social development. If climate change is hindering these processes of peacebuilding then the risk of a relapse into conflict is high.

### ► Developing integrated early warning systems

There have been several references made by government representatives during SC meetings to improve the integration of environmental and resource-related variables into conflict early-warning systems. As structural factors, these variables can influence different stages of the conflict continuum. Accordingly, there have repeatedly been requests for more sophisticated early warning systems using a broader set of indicators to include also data that allow for observing trends such as access to water or food.

### ► Engaging in Preventive Diplomacy

Another reoccurring element of the climate-security debates in the SC refers to the whole spectrum of preventive diplomacy. This preventive diplomacy needs to be used to address the potential negative repercussions of climate change on peace and security. In addition to early

warning systems, instruments for mediation and dispute settlement, the overall strengthening of adaptive capacities and many more, are essential parts of a toolbox of preventive diplomacy.

### 3.3.3 Synopsis of fragile countries positions on climate change in the Security Council

The permanent members of the Security Council have been actively engaged in the debate about the potential roles and positions of the Council towards climate change. Less attention has been spent on the perspectives of countries most affected by climate change as a potential security threat – countries considered as fragile. However, it is important to learn about the perspective of fragile countries as their position can, for example, indicate to what extent early action including adaptation measures on potentially destabilising climate change can be expected to be implemented from their side. This knowledge can also open up the discussion on potential international partnerships to jointly address the increasing challenges in the respective countries and what specific tools of a preventive diplomacy should be applied.

In order to have a common reference point to fragility, the Fund for Peace index results for fragile states that have been published more than a decade now are used. The Fragile States Index is based on a conflict assessment framework, which is also known as “CAST”. The CAST framework was designed to measure this vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations. Its methodology builds on both qualitative and quantitative indicators. The data assessment relies on public source data and aims at providing quantifiable results for twelve conflict risk indicators to measure the condition of a state at a certain moment. The indicators provide a snapshot in time that can be measured against other snapshots in a time series to determine whether conditions are improving or worsening. Below is the list of indicators used both in the CAST framework and also in the Fragile States Index. It differentiates four dimensions:

1. Cohesion (Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, Group Grievance)
2. Economic (Economic Decline, Uneven Economic Development, Human Flight and Brain Drain)
3. Political (State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Demographic Pressures)
4. Social (Refugees and IDPs, External Intervention)

The index results in four different stages and three subcategories each reaching from a sustainable to an alert stage. A compilation of fragility assessments through the Fund for Peace of the last decade illustrates that there are only few states leaving one of the four stages towards a more or less risky level. So, in sum, there is little notable change for the better. Compared to 37 states referenced as “alert” in 2007, eight states have left this stage by 2018 whereas five new countries needed to be added to the highest state fragility category. This category is again divided into three different levels. In 2007, the highest level comprised four countries (Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Zimbabwe), in 2018 five (Zimbabwe, DR Congo, Central African Republic, Syria). It is worth mentioning that all of these high alert countries are extremely vulnerable to climate change. As indicated in the table below, only very few of these countries took the opportunity in 2007 and 2011 to provide an input statement to the SC on climate change and security. In this analysis, it is just focused on these two debates since they have been the ones most dedicated to the topic of climate change and security. As already outlined, there has been an increasing momentum for this topic as a cross-cutting element for fragile situations such as at Lake Chad or Somalia in some of the related debates. In addition, there have been quite a number of informal discussions (the so-called Aria Formula debates). However, due to the informal character they have been less well documented.



**Figure 4: Trends in fragility 2007 - 2018**Source: <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/excel/>

## The 2007 debate

The debate in 2007 was announced not only as focussing on climate and security but also on energy. Among the governments taking a position during the 2007 debate were only three considered at an “alert” stage of fragility at that time.

## Congo

Congo in principal agreed that the international community should be aware of roles of international bodies related to sustainable development issues. However, “...we must recognize the seriousness of what is at stake — namely, the need for and the urgency of appropriate responses to a major risk to international peace and security.” As chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Security Council on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, Congo sees the debate on climate change as a major threat to the prevention of conflicts and as necessary to raise awareness on the topic of climate change. The cause of these risks was further framed as a result of an increasing divide between rich and poor countries. Congo further stressed in its statement the need for individual and collective action and the role of early action to avoid “conflicts over water, the spread of diseases, and a big increase in worldwide migration unless adequate adaptation measures are adopted and integrated into long-term development planning.”

**Pakistan**

Pakistan presented its statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. As such, it saw the decision by the SC to hold a debate on energy, climate and security sceptical since the Council's primary responsibility is for the maintenance of international peace and security, as set out in the United Nations Charter. Representing the G77 Groups and China, Pakistan stressed the role of the international community to provide "[..] adequate, predictable, new and additional financial resources, technology transfer and enhancing capacity-building for the developing countries." In this context, Pakistan asked also for more commitment to explore innovative ways of applying energy-efficient, environmentally sound, cost effective and socially acceptable technologies and systems.

**Sudan**

Sudan spoke on behalf of the African Group in the SC and aligned itself with the statements made by the representatives of the Group of 77 and China. Accordingly, it also expressed its concern regarding the decision of the SC to hold an open debate on issues that do not fall within the Council's mandate: "Energy and climate change are both development issues and, as such, should be tackled within the parameters of development and the impediments to its achievement, and should be addressed by the relevant specialized mandated organs of the United Nations, not the Security Council." As main request, Sudan referred to the commitments developed countries made during the major United Nations conferences to support Africa as the most vulnerable continent, and to provide adequate and predictable resources and environmentally sound technology. In this context, the important role of providing access to energy was stressed and linked to the need of foreign direct investments in the energy sector in Africa.

**The debate 2011**

In 2011, again only a few states considered to be in an alarming status of fragility presented a statement – among them again Pakistan and Sudan.

**Nigeria**

According to Nigeria's statement the "[..] challenges posed by climate change are immense and the consequences for peace and security wide-ranging." Nigeria referred to challenges like food security and resource management, which are threatened by this phenomenon. The then food crisis in the Horn of Africa was taken as an example with its threats to water management, animal health and crop production, which are magnified by political instability and insecurity. The SC should take concerted action to mitigate and adapt to avoid that "[..] scarcity breeds fear, which in turn fuels conflict."

**Pakistan**

Pakistan associated itself with the statement by the Group of 77 and China but also added specific points on the situation of the country where climate change affects almost all sectors, in particular those of water resources, energy, health, forestry and biodiversity. The most significant impact was on agricultural productivity, which was negatively affected by unprecedented floods in 2010. Against this backdrop, Pakistan sees the urgent need of addressing the threat that climate change poses.

## Sudan

In its intervention, Sudan asked all agencies of the United Nations to focus on the root causes of conflict to achieve peace and security. The alternative, as the representative from Sudan outlined, is to spend much money on peacekeeping operations that do not address its root causes.

### **Lack of knowledge on the position of fragile states on climate security**

Only about one tenth of the states that are at an alarming state of fragility have been actively engaged in the SC debates on climate change and security. This can be seen as a major shortcoming since the discourse on climate change and security has apparently not yet arrived at the group of states that will be significantly affected by a changing climate. More interestingly, with Pakistan and Sudan the same states took the floor during both debates. Sudan seems to have changed its position towards bringing the topic to the SC slightly as there is not so much of the criticism of the 2007 intervention left in 2011. In a similar way, Pakistan turned away from just referring to the UNFCCC-related international support structure and highlighted in 2011 the negative impact of climate change on the countries through the 2010 flooding in the country. None of the interventions offers really an idea how to address climate change in concrete conflict-prone situation. Against this backdrop, it may be useful not only to consider new discussion rounds on climate change and security in the SC but to further explore the preferences of fragile states how to deal with this topic. In the last section, it will be drawn some conclusions how to deal with this situation.

### **3.3.4 Conclusions**

The SC has become an important forum to address climate change and security as a topic. So far, the role has been mainly as an agenda setter. Fragile states have not played a major part in framing the issue. The overall number of interventions during the debates in 2007 and 2011 were really large compared to other SC debates. However, only few states of those defined to be at an “alert stage” according to the Fund of Peace categorization of fragile states participated actively. As a result, the SC as an institution may miss the chance to move over from an agenda setting stage to one where early action on climate change related security risks is pushed forward. What are the potential entry points to avoid such a situation in the future, especially with respect to the non-permanent membership in the SC of Germany in 2019 and 2020? The following recommendations, also in combination, may help to enable a more meaningful representation of fragile states in the SC debates on climate change and security.

### **Foster bilateral exchange between foreign policy makers of fragile states and SC members**

In order to encourage more active involvement of fragile states representatives during SC climate security related debates, foreign policy makers from governments like Germany may invite for bilateral briefing sessions. These briefing sessions can help to introduce the history of SC coverage of the topic and the main priorities of the respective countries in terms of climate change impacts that are either visible already today or likely in the near future. In addition, the briefings may reveal insights on the degree to which the state is already involved in climate change adaptation initiatives and what are main barriers for a stronger involvement. Last but not least, there may be the chance to try to engage interested partners in the so called “Groups of Friends” on the topic in the SC which is currently active as part of an initiative by the Swedish Government.

### **Engage with groups and alliances representing fragile states**

Another way to engage with fragile states may be to put a stronger role on the so called g7+ group of states which are defining themselves as fragile and try to join forces with international

donors to address key issues of the fragility. So far, the role of climate change and environment has only been a minor one. For example, climate change is not a main indicator used to display the state of fragility in the fragility assessment the states prepared. A stronger focus and even a joint statement at the SC on the main drivers of climate change related security risks but also potential response measures can be a meaningful contribution to the debate.

### **Initiate an ongoing exchange on climate change as a risk multiplier in fragile states**

As a complementing process to any single SC related debate on the topic, it may require some preparation or ongoing discussion on the relevance of climate change for fragile countries. Such an exchange can be structured as regional consultation meetings offered by embassies of interested SC members or international or regional think tanks. Also, New York-based meetings, hosted e.g. by the German representation to the UN in New York can fulfil such a function. In any case, it will be important to take into consideration that climate change is always only one influencing factor and that the interplay with other factors is highlighted. In addition, also during such consultations it will be important to identify and highlight where peacebuilding and adaptation programs have already been established and delivered meaningful insights to promote a stronger focus on the response side of conflict-sensitive adaptation.

### **Develop analytical pieces and guidance notes on how to address climate change in fragile countries**

In order to enable a sound and substantial debate in the SC, more analyses on the actual shortcomings regarding climate change and security linkages and how to address them will be helpful. A guideline on conflict sensitive adaptation is only one tool in a more comprehensive toolbox to highlight how resilience strengthening in fragile contexts can be achieved. More profound information would be helpful where and how climate finance is available for fragile countries or what successfully implemented programmes already tell us. This can help to enable processes of cross-country learning.

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## 4 Consultations and external views on conflict-sensitive adaptation

As part of the project, national and international consultations were organized to discuss preliminary findings of the report. In the context of a broader expert consultation process to incorporate insights and external views of different stakeholders, three workshops were organized.

### 4.1 Expert workshop “From Knowledge to Action: Criteria for Conflict-Sensitive Climate Change Adaptation”

The workshop organised at the 4<sup>th</sup> of May 2017 in Berlin focused on different criteria for conflict-sensitive climate change adaptation and precisely on questions revolving around goals, instruments and implementation opportunities of conflict-sensitive approaches to climate change adaptation. As part of the expert workshop, the project team presented initial findings based on three core hypotheses:

- ▶ Hypothesis 1: Conflict-sensitive approaches can add value to adaptation projects if the different target dimensions of conflict prevention or peacebuilding are clearly stated.
- ▶ Hypothesis 2: In order to make climate programmes conflict-sensitive it is necessary to use different instruments. These should contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the conflict situation and the interactions of a project and the context.
- ▶ Hypothesis 3: Case studies suggest that conflict-sensitive approaches can be successful if they are context-specific, participative, long-term and flexible.

#### Key lessons learned:

Based on the expert workshop, three key lessons learned for the development of the guide were summarized. Firstly, to maximise impact, the guidelines should be tailored to specific topics and target groups. Secondly, in a guide to climate adaptation projects with peace-promoting objectives, the identification of peace potentials should be a separate step. And finally, the implementation of conflict-sensitive projects with peace-promoting objectives should pay particular attention to cultural legitimacy. More participation does not automatically mean more legitimacy.

See Annex for elaborated information on the expert workshop.

### 4.2 COP23 Workshop “How can adaptation help to stem climate change security risks?”

The consultation process was held during COP23 in Bonn (November 2017) and provided insights on adaptation and climate change security risks and particularly benefitted from contributions made by practitioners from the development and climate change area during the workshop. The presentations and roundtable discussions stressed the importance of adaptation in conflict-prone and fragile areas and gave input on the conflict-sensitive design of climate change adaptation measures from different points of views.

**Key lessons learned:**

The discussions from the workshop showed that the Climate / Security community has largely recognised the importance, opportunities and potential of the Adaptation Agenda. It was concluded that it is necessary to increase the understanding of the "adaptation community" for and the attention it pays to the positive effects of adaptation, especially in fragile states and also for the mitigation of the security risks posed by climate change. Moreover, the necessity to include different target groups was highlighted, as well as the importance of the developing adaptation concepts, ToR for adaptation projects and finding implementing institutions of adaptation projects. Moreover, a recommendation to develop a communication strategy for this purpose was made.

See Annex for elaborated information on insights from the presentation.

**4.3 Planetary Security Conference-Workshop “Connecting climate change and conflict sensitivity”**

The third workshop took place during the 2017 Planetary Security Conference, with representatives from the European Commission, the peace and development community, governments and academia who discussed practical experiences from the field that also informed the guidelines developed as part of this report.

In the first part of the workshop the need and relevance of conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change was highlighted. For example, the research project was introduced, the guidelines presented and, within the framework of selected input contributions (IGAD, European Commission), possible entry points for further discussion were raised. In the subsequent interactive second part of the workshop, the participants discussed the challenge of climate adaptation in conflict areas and possible solutions.

**Key lessons learned:**

The discussions showed that although the concept of conflict sensitivity is understood in its basic features in the adaptation and development community, there is still a need for further clarification. Hence, it is necessary to raise more awareness and create better understanding for the positive effects of a conflict-sensitive approach. Moreover, it also became clear that local groups should be (more) consistently involved in programme / project development. Consideration should also be given to whether and how the knowledge and financial potential of diaspora organisations and so-called 'migrant self-organisations' could be better used to support fragile states or to develop complementary funding sources for adaptation projects.

See Annex for elaborated information on insights from the presentation.

## 5 Elements of a guide to conflict-sensitive adaptation

The guide to conflict-sensitive adaptation (Tänzler/Scherer 2019), summarised in the following with a focus on four modules, outlines how to design and implement an adaptation project in a fragile or conflict-affected context. Fragility is the inability (whether whole or partial) of a state to fulfil its responsibilities as a sovereign entity, including a lack of legitimacy, authority, and capacity. It provides guidance to ensure that an adaptation project does not exacerbate tensions and, ideally, contributes to peace and stability. The guide is of general nature. It is neither prescriptive nor does it provide an in-depth treatment of policy-specific issues and challenges.

The guide is structured along the “typical” phases of a climate change adaptation project cycle and comprises four modules (vulnerability assessment, planning & design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). Each module provides guidelines on how to integrate conflict sensitivity.

### Module 1: Vulnerability analysis supplemented by a conflict analysis

The first module focuses on supplementing the vulnerability analysis with a conflict analysis to identify conflict factors and risks. The first step is to conduct a conflict analysis which should be done for all projects planned in fragile or conflict-affected states. The goal of a conflict analysis is to gain a thorough understanding of the fragile or conflict-affected situation on the ground. Some of the key topics include developing a conflict profile, including some of the political, economic, socio-cultural context; examining the conflict causes, such as structural sources of the conflict; identifying conflict actors as well as analysing conflict dynamics, such as the current conflict trends. In a second step the scope of the project is determined. In this step it should be defined if the project will follow a do-no-harm principle (minimalistic position), a prevention of future principle (climate-induced) or conflicts position (maximalist position). The third step is to integrate climate risks into the conflict analysis. This is only applicable if the adaptation project also aims to go beyond do-no-harm and an emphasis is set on preventing possible climate-induced conflicts. In this case the conflict analysis should be reviewed to include the climate risks into the analysis and consider how climate change might affect the fragile or conflictual situation on the ground in the future. To do so, previous conflict analysis should be reviewed (profile, causes, actors, and dynamics) in light of a “theory of change”, which are hypotheses on why and how climate change could affect or even trigger a conflict in the future. These include direct resource competition, increased grievances over relative deprivation and increased extreme weather events.

### Module 2: Planning and design supplemented by a pro-peace analysis

The second module concentrates on conducting a pro-peace analysis to identify opportunities to promote peace and security (if desired). If the adaptation project should offer additional synergies by contributing to promote peace and security, the conflict analysis developed in the previous module should be supplemented by a “pro-peace analysis”<sup>12</sup>. This planning and design stage refers to the practice of identifying options to adapt to climate change and identifying and evaluating them in terms of criteria such as availability, benefits, costs, effectiveness, efficiency and feasibility. The purpose of a “pro-peace analysis” is to get a thorough understanding of the connectors and local capacities for peace. The key topics that may inform the “pro-peace analysis” include the local needs for peaceful development, the connectors and local capacities for peace as well as opportunities for action that can positively contribute to peace and security. Once the opportunities for promoting peace and security

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<sup>12</sup> The authors use the more simplified term “pro-peace analysis” to refer to an “Analysis of connectors and local capacities for peace”. The “Analysis of connectors and local capacities for peace” is an own analytical step in the seven-step Do-No-Harm framework (see exemplarily CDA 2004: 3 or Wallace 2015:117). Often this type of analysis is also integrated in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) frameworks (see, for instance, the PCIA framework originally developed by Kenneth Bush 1998).

are identified, the concrete project ideas that are focused on supporting the needs for peace and security should be developed. The ideas will be highly context and sector-specific.

### Module 3: Implementation supplemented by an impact assessment

The third module is based on conducting an impact assessment to anticipate possible negative interactions between the project and the conflict context, and revising the project accordingly. As a first step, the impacts of a project need to be anticipated, assessed and evaluated. Being conflict-sensitive implies that an adaptation project is designed in a way, that it does not adversely create or exacerbate conflict ('do-no-harm'). To find out, the impact of the conflict on the proposed project and vice versa – the impact of the project on the conflict have to be analysed. The proposed areas to be examined are the effect of the conflict on the initiative, the effect of the initiative on the conflict, the contribution assessment as well as the risk mitigation and peace promotion strategies. The next step is to integrate the findings from the analysis into the project. The key task is to review all parameters of the intended programme/project (the goal, design and implementation strategy) in light of the analytical findings. The guiding principle for the revision is thereby to minimise risk and to maximise opportunities.

### Module 4: Monitoring and evaluation of conflict sensitiveness

The fourth module focuses on tracking and preventing unintended negative impacts. At first, the evaluation criteria is developed and operationalised. The core of monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity is to track and prevent the negative impacts of the project on the conflict context and of the conflict context on the project. Monitoring is the systematic collection of information while evaluation is the systematic assessment of information and learning the systematic revision of the project. It allows for a continuous monitoring and rigorous evaluation of a project's process and impact. Three criteria seem to be particularly helpful to evaluate the conflict sensitivity of a project<sup>13</sup>: *Relevance*, *Impact* and *Effectiveness*. In a second step, the data on these three criteria is gathered and analysed. There are a number of ways to operationalise them and thus tools to identify and measure a project's relevance, impact and effectiveness. They include indicators, interviews, and qualitative assessments. In a third step the project is again revised to minimise the risks and maximise opportunities.

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## 6 Conclusion and recommendations

Implementing an adaptation project in a conflict-sensitive way is a complex and challenging undertaking. Fragile and conflict-ridden contexts are characterised by difficult and fast-changing political environments. These conditions may limit the possibility to apply a conflict sensitivity approach. At the same time, even the most careful application of conflict sensitivity instruments does not guarantee success. To accept these limitations and do what is do-able in a challenging context is important.

Nevertheless, it is worth striving to adhere to conflict-sensitivity principles. Continuous reflection about the consequences of project activities helps to minimise negative consequences. And mitigating new conflicts may already count as a success in fragile and conflict-affected environments. With the guidelines on conflict sensitive adaptation the authors hope to stimulate this debate and offer a helpful set of tools and instruments that can be systematically applied in different fragile and conflict-prone contexts and beyond.

Throughout this report elements of an overall framework of recommendations were gathered. The latter are summarised in the set of guidelines. The consultation process outlined in chapter four evinced that the guidelines require to be applied to further prove and verify their relevance and appropriateness.

Potential entry points to apply the guidelines in concrete contexts are, among others:

- International Climate Initiative: Identify pilot countries and regions that are willing to apply the guidelines throughout programme design and implementation.
- Germany's non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council in 2019/2020 offers the chance to present the guideline as German contribution to concrete solution to enable early action in fragile and conflict-prone countries. The use of the guidelines can also be part of bilateral consultation approaches between Germany, members of the group of friends and partner countries to support the integration of the latter into the upcoming debates on climate change as a threat to peace and security.
- Regional organisation and arrangements such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa already active in the context of resilience building and climate change adaptation can serve as partner to explore the use of guidelines at a regional level. IGAD already articulated concrete interest during the stage of consultations on the guidelines.
- National level activities of countries: explore the chance to offer using the guideline as part of the implementation of Nationally Determined Contribution in countries considered as fragile or conflict prone to inform adaptation with concrete co-benefits which can also ask for additional funding or support from international partners.
- Green Climate Fund and Adaptation Fund can consider including the guideline in relevant readiness activities to access the funds. This can include the guidelines as it is, piloting of concrete activities in certain contexts, training, webinars and other capacity development activities.

## 7 Annex: Consultations and external views on conflict sensitive adaptation

### 7.1 Expert workshop “From Knowledge to Action: Criteria for Conflict-Sensitive Climate Change Adaptation”

As part of this expert workshop the project team presented initial findings

#### 7.1.1 Introductory presentation “From Knowledge to Action”

##### Introduction

- ▶ The event is part of the project “Development of an Orientation Guide for the Conflict-Sensitive Design of Adaptation Measures to Climate Change” (FKZ 3715 41 105 0), which is managed by the Federal Environmental Agency and implemented by adelphi.
- ▶ Background of the project is the increasing importance of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and civil conflict transformation in international climate and environmental policy: on the one hand there is a greater awareness about the possible security implications of climate change (“climate change as threat multiplier”), on the other hand there is a growing understanding about the increasing fragility of states where adaptation services are provided.
- ▶ Conflict-sensitive approaches have their historical roots in humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peace and conflict management: international climate policy can make use of project-relevant experience when planning and implementing adaptation measures. It is important to ensure the knowledge exchange and sharing of experiences and the translation of the approaches into the appropriate climate and environmental policy language.

##### Three core hypotheses:

- ▶ Conflict-sensitive approaches have different goals: Conflict-sensitive approaches can be conceived with at least two different objectives – conflict prevention or peacebuilding. However, these objectives are often not clearly distinguished in practice.

**Hypothesis 1:** Conflict-sensitive approaches can add value to adaptation projects if the different target dimensions of conflict prevention or peacebuilding are clearly stated.

- ▶ Conflict-sensitive approaches work with different instruments and methods: there is not one conflict-sensitive approach, but a whole series of approaches and methods, each of which has a different focus.

**Hypothesis 2:** In order to make climate programmes conflict-sensitive it is necessary to use different instruments. These should contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the conflict situation and the interactions of a project and the context.

- ▶ Conflict-sensitive approaches require comprehensive implementation: Practical experience shows that the way in which a conflict-sensitive approach is implemented determines whether it may or may not lead to success.

**Hypothesis 3:** Case studies suggest that conflict-sensitive approaches can be successful if they are context-specific, participative, long-term and flexible.

### 7.1.2 Presentation “Practical Challenges in the Implementation of Conflict- and Context-Sensitivity”

- ▶ For GIZ Conflict- and Context-Sensitivity essentially means “working in/on conflict, violence and fragility” according to Sonja Vorwerk-Halve (GIZ)
- ▶ Two-stage examination procedure for the preparation of offers: preliminary examination and in-depth examination
  - Preliminary check with checklist and country risk assessment list (yellow = increased risk, red = high, acute risk)
  - For yellow and red countries: Always deepened examination(s) for conflict and context sensitivity and human rights
- ▶ The second step consists in the concretisation of context and stakeholder analyses for the project / region
  - Methodological framework: Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA)
- ▶ Practical challenges are
  - Cultural backgrounds of own staff (for example, implicit messages)
  - Involvement of partners (language, conflict management, etc.)
  - Complexes, too theoretical methods and explanations can provoke resistance
  - Exchange and learning platforms require time and resources
  - High risk countries – safety standards are more costly

### Discussion and comments following the presentation

- ▶ Analytical approach should be subordinated to goal determination: It is important to clarify in advance which goal is pursued: Preventing conflict? Avoiding conflict? Creating resilience? Practical experience shows that “Do-No-Harm” approach and peacebuilding are difficult to combine. Peacebuilding projects are based on different analysis than projects for conflict prevention. A peace-promoting project should above all analyse and clearly define the peace-promoting potential. Accordingly, the identification of potential is a partial step in the development of a guide to peacebuilding.
- ▶ A guideline becomes more relevant in terms of target group and project-specific orientation: it is important to define the guideline’s target group (for example, state or non-state actors, national / international actors). In general, the closer the guide is to the organisation's requirements / processes / work levels and project goals, the better. A concrete guide with clear, simple instructions is often of great benefit. Overly complex guidelines are not applicable for smaller partner organisations. In further work it is important to consider

already existing approaches for example. This applies to the International Climate Initiative (IKI) in the area of the Safeguard Policy, which was adopted in December 2016. In German development cooperation, there are also established structures in project / programme preparation through Peace and Conflict Assessments, which must be taken into account.

- ▶ Avoiding new conflicts is already an implementation success: the practical implementation of projects often raises the question of how sustainably established structures are. Conflicts are sometimes deep. It is important to have realistic expectations with regards to implementation; the prevention of new conflicts can already be considered as a success.
- ▶ Implementation success also depends on the ability to absorb and on political will: The success of conflict-sensitive measures depends on the ability of the partner to absorb and on the political will, but both can only be achieved to a limited extent through greater participation (at the project level). It is therefore advisable to address the issue at a higher (political) level and to create incentives (through donors?) for correspondingly higher standards. However, it is also a matter of fact that participatory work is in principle very time and resource consuming, and often does not fit into the operations of the donors and length of the project cycles.

### **7.1.3 Presentation: “Practical Challenges in the Implementation of Conflict- and Context-Sensitivity”**

- ▶ Key research question of the SFB: "How and under what conditions is effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood possible?" according to Leon Schettler (University of Potsdam, SFB 700)
- ▶ Configurations of limited statehood: Restricting the ability to enforce the monopoly of force / Rules at three levels: 1) Territorial (=Territories), 2) Sectoral (=Policy areas), 3) Social (= Social groups)
- ▶ Legitimacy depends on context and governance performance: what makes a governance performance legitimate depends on the prevailing legitimacy concept in the specific context. It should be remembered that there are different legitimacy concepts (for example input vs. output legitimacy). Different governance services require different forms of legitimacy.
- ▶ In principle, the more complex the governance services - the more actions and actors involved - the higher the degree of institutionalisation required (determination of responsibilities, conflict resolution procedures, funding etc.) to create legitimacy.

### **Discussion and comments following the presentation on “Governance in areas of limited statehood”**

- ▶ External actors should rely on legitimate governance-building instead of state-building: The "failed states" concept is too coarse and not synonymous with the lack of effective ruling. Successful governance in individual regions / policy fields / social groups is quite possible - even if the national monopoly on violence of a state (and thus its formal statehood) is not or only partially given. Instead of state-building, one should better focus on governance-building.

- ▶ The provision of governance services requires more precise, multi-layered context analyses of the governance-providing actors. When it comes to the implementation of state projects, it is vital to involve partner governments.
- ▶ Participatory approaches do not automatically lead to greater legitimacy: Participatory approaches are based on input legitimacy (→ legitimacy through procedures / participation). As a result, legitimacy is generated by the fact that the parties to a regulation have the opportunity to influence the rulemaking process or that this process meets certain procedural criteria. In local contexts, however, entirely different concepts of legitimacy can prevail. Another idea of legitimacy would be, for example, output legitimacy. This means that legitimacy is generated through the governance services and their problem-solving abilities. Ultimately, the prevailing local legitimacy concept is crucial to successful project implementation. Certain governance services / actors would have to be considered by those concerned to be lawful and worthy of recognition. Accordingly, local concepts of legitimacy should be taken into account when designing / implementing a project.

#### 7.1.4 Final discussion points on a possible guideline format

- ▶ Guideline should be designed as to fit specific topics and target groups. One group of states, which has been specifically mentioned, concerns the g7 + states, which call themselves fragile and together with whom the potential for conflict-sensitive adaptation could be discussed.
- ▶ Topic-specific focus: The fight against the root causes of migration and flight is currently a key concern of the Federal Government (including the trend of climate refugees). The resettlement subject is related to this and will be an important topic in the future (together with shore protection). So far, relocations have proved to be conflicting. Similarly, the thematic tailoring of a guide to local resource conflicts / local resource management could be politically relevant.
- ▶ Target-group focus: Guidance could also be designed to strengthen the institutional framework for IKI, taking into account the recently established Safeguard Policy. A guide can in any case contribute to conflict sensitisation and fulfil an attention-catching function.

#### Key “lessons learned” for the development of the guide

1. To maximise impact, the guidelines should be tailored to specific topics and target groups
2. In a guide to climate adaptation projects with peace-promoting objectives, the identification of peace potentials should be separate step
3. The implementation of conflict-sensitive projects with peace-promoting objectives should pay particular attention to cultural legitimacy. More participation does not automatically mean more legitimacy.



## 7.2 Insights from the presentation at COP23: “How can adaptation help to stem climate change security risks?”

**Date:** Saturday, 11 November 2017, 13-17h

**Location:** BMUB, Robert-Schuman-Platz 3, 53175 Bonn, R. 1.130

**Participants:** Representatives from institutions active in the areas of climate change, development and peace

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### Agenda

#### 7.2.1 Introductory remarks

**Claudia Kabel (UBA)**

- ▶ Workshop is part of the project "Development of an Orientation Guide for the Conflict-Sensitive Design of Climate Change Adaptation Measures" (FKZ 3715 41 105 0), which is managed by the Federal Environmental Agency.

**Harald Neitzel (BMUB)**

- ▶ Highlighting the growing importance of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and civil conflict transformation in international climate and environmental policy.
- ▶ The Adaptation Agenda, including the PA's "Loss and Damages" mechanism, provides ample opportunities to address the known security risks of climate change, including climate-induced migration, in one form or another.
- ▶ Guide should provide orientation on this subject.
- ▶ Welcomes greater awareness of the potential safety implications of climate change.

#### 7.2.2 Presentation: What kind of guidance is needed?

**Dennis Tänzler (adelphi)**

- ▶ Explanation of the project "Development of an orientation guide for the conflict-sensitive design of climate change adaptation measures";
- ▶ Highlighting the security-related implications of climate change (climate change as threat multiplier, seven climate fragility risk compounds);
- ▶ Clarification of the relation between adaptation and conflict (including "maladaptation", unintended side effects, peace-promoting potential) in the context of fragile statehood;
- ▶ Fragile states are not as much involved in climate change processes as other states (lack of capacities, often weak institutions, deficits in authority, legitimacy);
- ▶ Highlight the need to carry out climate adaptation measures in a conflict-sensitive manner;

- Relevance not only for a pure adaptation process, but also in the context of the development of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC process).

#### **Nikolas Scherer (adelphi)**

- Introduction to the concept of "conflict sensitivity" and explanation of the ambiguity of the term: conflict sensitivity can be classified on a continuum from do-no-harm (minimalist position) to peace promotion (maximalist position);
- The guide formulates recommendations for both positions;
- Presentation of the guide;
- Presentation of the goal, the target group (adaptation community) and the methodological basis (analysis of the previous guide / analysis of good practice examples);
- Explanation of the individual steps for the implementation of conflict-sensitive adaptation projects;
- Explanation of good practice to successfully carry out climate change adaptation measures in the context of fragile statehood

#### **7.2.3 Input Statements: Conflict sensitivity in practice – insights from the field**

##### **Meghan Parker (Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC)**

- Comment: The guide is very well structured, logical, understandable, application-oriented, not too long;
- Suggestions for improvement: General consideration whether peace-building measures should be non-compulsory for adaptation measures;
- Encouraging gender aspects to be included; Examination, whether to include references to concrete good and also bad practice examples;
- Suggestion to consider whether guidance on securing resources (financial resources, human resources) to realise conflict-sensitive adaptation projects should be integrated;
- Suggestion to better highlight the limits of the guide: Realising conflict-sensitive projects is per se very complex and will not be fully feasible in all cases;
- A brief presentation of USAID's "Climate Change and Conflict" guide and a review of the complex policy work on the relationship between climate change and migration as part of the climate change and security debate.

##### **Shreya Mitra (International Alert, London)**

- Stressing from personal experience in the peace work of International Alert that there is a great need for adaptation projects to be conflict-sensitive;
- The guide makes an important contribution to addressing an existing gap;

- ▶ Personal experience in practice is that the term "conflict sensitivity" can often be difficult to translate and partly also politically problematic;
- ▶ An essential entry point is a precise climate-sensitive conflict analysis: Conflicts as well as climate impacts can be regionally limited, but at the same time they do not know national borders;
- ▶ It is important that policy makers (including senior management) are aware of the increased risks and resource demands that result from projects in fragile contexts;
- ▶ Collecting and highlighting good practice examples is very important and can facilitate learning processes;

**Katie Peters (ODI, London)**

- ▶ Climate adaptation is very important, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states and regions;
- ▶ As her own research shows (focus here especially on disaster management), these states are highly vulnerable due to fragility and violence and have a high need for support on climate adaptation measures;
- ▶ This is particularly so because many of them are Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which in any case have very limited state resources;
- ▶ Problem: the incentive structures in the process of project selection and awarding mean that so far hardly any climate adaptation funds are channelled into these countries; an improvement of the situation is urgently needed here;
- ▶ Homework for political decision makers: improve the financing options for affected states;
- ▶ Next step then, adaptation projects in these contexts should be conflict-sensitive;
- ▶ The presented guide makes an important contribution in this regard.

**7.2.4 Roundtable Discussion: What prospects for adaptation in conflict-prone areas?**

- ▶ Greater attention needs to be paid to addressing conflict sensitivity in the selection and awarding process of climate adaptation projects in fragile state contexts; Fragile and conflict-affected states are particularly affected by the consequences of climate change, but they have clear limitations on access to climate finance;
- ▶ Implementation of the guide will be challenging: It is important to promote and establish a "community of practice"; this means a group of experts who, in the policy area under discussion, form a (network) community with relevant experience that interacts on a regular basis. In this way, it can be ensured that the guide is applied and experiences gained in the application process of the guide are incorporated in its improvement;

- ▶ Adaptation processes (such as the preparation of National Adaptation Plans, in short: NAP process) are key entry points for the guide; but also other processes beyond pure climate adaptation (NDC process, Agenda 2030 / SDGs, UNCCD, Sendai Framework);
- ▶ Collection of negative examples of (adaptation) projects in contexts of fragile statehood and beyond are extremely important for the learning process;
- ▶ Suggestion to expand the guide and include a sector / project specific questionnaire and to present practical experiences;
- ▶ Suggestion to raise open questions in order to advance the discussion.

### **Suggestions for outreach / further action**

- ▶ In its current version (1.0) the guide shall:
  - Be presented for an in-depth review to a selection of adaptation experts (until early / mid December 2017)
  - Be presented in the context of a workshop during the yearly organised “Planetary Security Conference” by the Dutch Foreign Ministry (12 and 13 December)
- ▶ The version prepared on the basis of these comments (1.1) should be presented in the following contexts:
  - To a selection of actors involved in the IKI
  - To the staff responsible for adaptation in the “Sektorvorhaben Klima” of GIZ
  - To the ministers and ministry representatives invited to the kick-off meeting in the context of a final presentation

In this way, the specific embedding into existing procedures / rules for project assignments of the German climate and development policy can be tested and further application possibilities can be specified.

### **7.2.5 Concluding remarks by Harald Neitzel (BMU)**

- ▶ Discussion has shown that the Climate / Security community has largely recognised the importance, opportunities and potential of the Adaptation Agenda;
- ▶ Unfortunately, this does not apply to the "Adaptation Community", as also reflected in the participant composition of the event;
- ▶ It is necessary to increase the understanding of the "adaptation community" for and the attention it pays to the positive effects of adaptation, especially in fragile states; also for the mitigation of the security risks posed by climate change;
- ▶ Necessity to include different target groups; development of adaptation concepts, ToR for adaptation projects and implementing institutions of adaptation projects;
- ▶ Recommendation to develop a communication strategy for this purpose.

### **7.3 Insights from presentation at Planetary Security Conference: “Connecting climate change and conflict sensitivity”**

**Date:** Tuesday, 12 December 2017, 14.30 – 17h

**Location:** Planetary Security Conference, Marriot Hotel, Johan de Wittlaan 30, 2517 Den Haag,

**Participants:** about 50 representatives from policy, research and civil society.

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#### **Agenda**

##### **7.3.1 Session I: How to link conflict-sensitivity and climate change adaptation**

The first part of the workshop highlighted the need and relevance of conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change. For example, the research project was introduced, the guidelines presented and, within the framework of selected input contributions (IGAD, European Commission), possible entry points for further discussion were raised.

##### **Dennis Tänzler: Introductory remarks**

- ▶ Presentation of the project "Development of an orientation guide for the conflict-sensitive design of adaptation measures to climate change";
- ▶ Highlighting the security-related implications of climate change and the opportunities for adaptation as a crisis and conflict prevention approach ("climate change as threat multiplier", seven climate fragility risk compounds);
- ▶ Highlighting the need for conflict-sensitive climate adaptation

##### **Nikolas Scherer: A guide to conflict sensitive adaptation**

- ▶ Introduction to the concept of "conflict sensitivity" and explanation of the ambiguity of the term: conflict sensitivity can be classified on a continuum from do-no-harm (minimalist position) to peace promotion (maximalist position);
- ▶ Presentation of the goal, the target group (adaptation community) and the methodological basis of the guideline (analysis of the previous guideline / analysis of good practice examples);
- ▶ Presentation of the guideline and its various modules

##### **Ayan Mahmoud (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD): The relevance of conflict sensitive adaptation in East Africa**

- ▶ Presentation of the goal ("Ending Drought Emergencies in the Horn of Africa"), tasks, structure, analysis and policy instruments of IGAD.
- ▶ Explanation that drought catastrophes are increasingly threatening the livelihoods of people who depend on agriculture and livestock for their living; heavy famine in 2011 in the arid

and semi-arid regions of the Great Horn of Africa led to the founding of the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development).

- ▶ IGAD is increasingly turning to the causes of conflict and migration; IGAD's regional platform for the implementation of its Drought Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative, IDDRSI) plays an important coordinating role.
- ▶ Explanation why a conflict-sensitive approach is so necessary and why an orientation guide is so helpful.
- ▶ Among other things, IDDRSI promotes the strengthening of livelihoods as well as proactive approaches to conflict prevention and improved migration management; in this area conflict-sensitive guidelines could also be helpful.

#### **Elena Visnar Malinovska (DG CLIMA, Europäische Kommission): EU Perspectives on connecting climate change and conflict**

- ▶ Statement that the EU is aware of the external and security implications of natural disasters and climate change; However, to date, knowledge has only been translated into strategy documents to a limited extent;
- ▶ The EU's adaptation strategy and disaster control are particularly inward looking because the formulation of climate change adaptation strategies in EU member states is just beginning;
- ▶ The problem-solving of cross-border climate impacts and the establishment of supra-regional adaptation measures remain on the agenda of the EU Commission and other EU institutions;
- ▶ Conflict sensitivity is at least partially included: For EU-funded projects in fragile contexts, the allocation of funds should always be conflict-sensitive.

#### **7.3.2 Session II: Practical experiences from the field – challenges and opportunities in linking climate change adaptation and peacebuilding**

In the subsequent interactive second part of the workshop, the participants discussed the challenge of climate adaptation in conflict areas and possible solutions. As part of a "Station Talk", the participants have self-organisationally assigned themselves to one of the three topics ("stations"): strategy, financing, implementation. In addition to the discussion, the station talk also served to intensify networking. The various contributions to the discussion were noted / systematised on a bulletin board and finally presented again in plenary.

##### **Station 1: Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity**

- ▶ Guiding question: What does it require to incorporating conflict sensitivity into strategic thinking / organisational practice with regard to climate change adaptation?
- ▶ Moderator: Lukas Rüttinger, adelphi



- ▶ It is generally necessary to create a greater awareness of what "conflict sensitivity" actually means because the term is unclear;
- ▶ Benefits of conflict sensitive action should be communicated more clearly, e.g. by an illustration of good practice examples;
- ▶ In addition to the development of sector-specific guidelines, there are a number of other important success factors: Conflict sensitivity should be part of existing analysis and strategy processes and it needs the support of management and experts (in the case of conflict-sensitive adaptation, one needs both climate and conflict expertise). Building networks can also be helpful here;
- ▶ In the field, local actors should be integrated (more) consistently;
- ▶ The overall goal of a conflict-sensitive approach is to encourage actors to be self-reflective and context-specific in their work

## **Station 2: Implementing conflict sensitivity**

- ▶ Guiding question: What are practical challenges for implementing conflict sensitivity on programme/project level and ways to overcome them?
- ▶ Moderator: Nikolas Scherer, adelphi
- ▶ Climate adaptation projects are conflict-sensitive and sustainably successful if they are really "locally driven". In practice, this is not always the case. The conclusion is that programmes and projects should be more geared to local needs and capacities. To ensure this, local actors should be more seriously and more strongly involved in planning and implementation than before.
  - Nota bene – Conclusion for the IKI: Projects under the IKI should make greater use of participatory project development methods. For this purpose, methods of participatory project development (e.g. design thinking, co-creation) should be further developed.
- ▶ It must be ensured that as many local actors as possible benefit from programmes / projects and that the corresponding (financial, technical, human) resources are available;
  - Nota bene – Conclusion for the IKI: Projects under the IKI should be designed for a longer term and with more financial resources. Short project cycles and too little use of resources increase the risk of negative, unintended side effects.
- ▶ The implementation of such projects should also help to critically examine own organisational-technical procedures;
- ▶ Persistent human rights violations are a major problem, which can be addressed through dialogue and an accordingly tailored project.

### Station 3: Financing conflict-sensitive adaptation

- ▶ Guiding question: How can external partners (including donor organisations) support fragile and conflict-affected states to attract the necessary financial resources for (conflict-sensitive) adaptation?
- ▶ Moderator: Dennis Tänzler, adelphi
- ▶ Institutions (such as IGAD) can contribute to the de-risking of programmes in conflict-affected regions, thereby encouraging investment; very helpful in this context is the support provided by higher political levels (political buy-in);
- ▶ The willingness of migrants to invest in their home countries (remittances) is generally high; this potential could and should be better used (e.g. through more organised projects with diaspora organisations);
- ▶ Financing mechanisms must better respond to the local situation; a better mix of budget support and project-based funds is needed;
- ▶ Financing in fragile states is initially largely dependent on donations;
- ▶ Institutions or measures implemented by the UN Security Council can support climate action through their own portfolio - this does not only apply to adaptation, but also to climate mitigation (e.g. in terms of renewable energy as preferred source of electricity).

#### 7.3.3 Wrap-up/Concluding remarks

- ▶ The discussion has shown that although the concept of conflict sensitivity is understood in its basic features in the adaptation and development community, there is still a need for further clarification; it is necessary to raise more awareness and create better understanding for the positive effects of a conflict-sensitive approach.
- ▶ It has also become clear that local groups should be (more) consistently involved in programme / project development.
- ▶ Consideration should also be given to whether and how the knowledge and financial potential of diaspora organisations and so-called 'migrant self-organisations' could be better used to support fragile states or to develop complementary funding sources for adaptation projects.